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One of the unique aspects of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is the
ability of a debtor to remain in possession of a business even after a
bankruptcy filing. In most cases, the same managers who presided over the
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debtor's financial decline may remain in effective control of the debtor's
day-to-day operations during the reorganization effort.' They also retain,
for at least some period of time, an exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan.2
This ability of management to retain control of the business during a
reorganization case is part of an effort to increase the effectiveness of the
reorganization process.3 Managers are more likely to attempt a Chapter 11
reorganization earlier, while the company is still a viable business capable
of being reorganized, if the managers have some confidence that they can
remain in their positions. 4 Also, permitting management to remain in
possession assures that those who are familiar with the business are able to
control the ongoing operations, utilizing their experience and contacts. Some

1. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1988). As a practical matter, at least in larger cases, management may in fact change either just before, or sometime after, a Chapter 11 filing. See
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669 (1993);
Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders:Evidence on Changes
in CorporateOwnershipand Control when FirmsDefault, 27 J. FIN. EcON. 355 (1990).
Yet, although the managers may change, the board of directors may well remain in place
during the reorganization effort. See, e.g., Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders
Comm. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 801 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986); Lionel Corp. v.
Committee of Equity Sec. Holders (In re Lionel Corp.), 30 B.R. 327 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983). See generally Anna Y. Chou, CorporateGovernance in Chapter 11: Electing a
New Board, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 559 (1991); Mark E. Budnitz, Chapter 11 Business
Reorganizationsand ShareholderMeetings: Will the Meeting Please Come to Order, or
Should the Meeting be CancelledAltogether?, 58 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 1214 (1990);
Michael A. Gerber, The Election of Directorsand Chapter11-The Second Circuit Tells
Stockholders to Walk Softly and Carrya Big Lever, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 295 (1987). For
purposes of this Article, I consider both the officers and the directors to be part of the
management of the debtor. Cf. Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter
11 Business Governance:FiduciaryDuties, BusinessJudgment,Trustees andExclusivity,
6 BANKR. DEv. J. 1, 21 (1989) (describing management as "the officers, directors,
retained professionals and business managers"); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9001(5) (defining
"debtor" as including "any or all of its officers, members of its board of directors or
trustees or of a similar controlling body, a controlling stockholder or member, or any
other person in control"). Thus, even if the chief executive officer is changed,
management in the hands of the board remains in place.
2. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b).
3. See, e.g., ELIZABETHE. WARREN &JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS

AND CREDrrORS 190 (2d ed. 1991) ("The principal benefit [of revised Chapter 11] might
be that companies will enter Chapter 11 earlier and therefore will be healthier and more
likely to survive when they do ....

[There may be an important benefit in jobs saved

and investments protected.").
4. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 231 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6191.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/8
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commentators have suggested that even the creditors will often prefer to deal
with managers with whom they are familiar than to suffer the time and
expense of educating a trustee or other third party about the business and its
problems.'
However, the debtor-in-possession concept is not without its costs.
Managers whose conduct likely contributed to or precipitated the debtor's
financial difficulty continue to manage the debtor in bankruptcy. Moreover,
the debtor-in-possession construct involves difficult corporate governance
issues as a result of the continued control of prebankruptcy managers. In
addition, one of the effects of the debtor-in-possession construct is a relatively unstructured Chapter 11 process in which no independent party is
responsible for moving the case along. In general, the debtor-in-possession
construct has provided a basis for questioning the credibility of the Chapter
11 process.
The Bankruptcy Code addresses these problems in several ways. Often,
problems with the debtor-in-possession construct can be addressed by active
committees, such as creditors' or equity security holders' committees.7 A
committee may consult with the debtor concerning the administration of the
case and investigate the debtor's financial condition, conduct, and viability,
as well as other matters relevant to the case or the development of a
5. See Peter F. Coogan et al., Comments on Some ReorganizationProvisionsof the
PendingBankruptcy Bills, 30 Bus. LAW. 1149, 1156 (1974).

6. When the debtor is insolvent, creditors are often residual owners of the business.
During the reorganization, however, these "owners" are, to some extent, disenfranchised

by the debtor-in-possession construct. Although they can have input with respect to
various business decisions, they cannot elect a new board or control the decision process.
Some commentators have maintained that the managers are more concerned with
their own profit and well-being than with the concerns of creditors and shareholders. See,

e.g., Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Casefor Chapter11, 101
YALE L.J. 1043 (1992). Others have observed that the debtor-in-possession concept

creates difficult issues concerning the managers' fiduciary obligations. See, e.g. Thomas
G. Kelch, The Phantom Fiduciary:The Debtor in Possession in Chapter11, 38 WAYNE
L. REV. 1323 (1992); Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum: CorporateGovernance

Problems in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 34 ARIz. L. REv. 89 (1992); Ninimer &
Feinberg, supra note 1. For an excellent recent discussion of the various issues
concerning corporate governance in Chapter 11, see LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1.
In some jurisdictions, management's fiduciary duties may be altered even prior to
a Chapter 11 filing, particularly if the debtor is insolvent. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 33-313 (1990); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (1991); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602

(1992); see also Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992);
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. 12150,
1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
7. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102, 1103 (1988). Creditors' committees are the subject of
another article in this symposium. See Kenneth N. Klee & K. John Shaffer, Creditors'
Committees Under Chapter11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 44 S.C. L. REv. 995 (1993).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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reorganization plan. A committee may also participate in plan negotiations
as a representative of its constituency and perform other acts in the interest
of those represented.' In general, committees can oversee the debtor's
conduct during the case and can often effectively address problems that flow
from the debtor-in-possession construct.
When the protection provided by the committees is insufficient to
address issues inherent in the debtor-in-possession construct, the Bankruptcy
Code provides for the appointment of an independent third party-a trustee
or an examiner-to protect the interests of various constituencies. 9 These
independent third parties represent the estate, as opposed to any particular
constituency, and can often investigate and act more credibly than the debtor
or committees."0 They can also be instrumental in assuring that the case
moves expeditiously towards resolution and can enhance the credibility of
the Chapter 11 process.
Although examiners and trustees can ameliorate many of the management difficulties, corporate governance issues, and process issues that may
arise in a Chapter 11 case, courts and parties to Chapter 11 proceedings
have generally been reluctant to utilize these third parties absent compelling
circumstances that strongly suggest a general need for third-party intervention. Both courts and parties to the proceedings have sometimes failed to
recognize that the Bankruptcy Code offers considerable flexibility with
respect to the use of trustees and examiners in Chapter 11 cases and that an
independent third party may effectively and efficiently assist in the
reorganization effort.
This Article suggests that recognition of a broad, flexible standard for
the appointment of trustees and examiners in Chapter 11 and imaginative use
of these independent third parties can facilitate resolution of many Chapter
11 cases. Although many Chapter 11 cases can be resolved adequately by
the debtor-in-possession and committee representatives without third-party
intervention, the ready availability of an independent third party can, in
other cases, address issues that arise under the debtor-in-possession construct

8. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c).
9. Id: § 1104.
10. The Bankruptcy Code also contains provisions for United States trustees who,
inter alia, are to "supervise the administration of cases and trustees in cases under
chapters 7, 11, or 13." 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3) (1988). The duties of the United States
trustee include monitoring the following: applications for compensation, plans and
disclosure statements, timely filing of schedules and reports, creditors' committees, and
progress of cases. Id. The United States trustee does not, however, manage debtors'
estates or generally investigate allegations of wrongdoing by the debtor. Consequently,
the United States trustee, as presently constituted and financed, cannot adequately fulfill
the role that can be served by an independent third party appointed to investigate,
manage, or mediate in a Chapter 11 case.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/8
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while assuring that the business can continue to operate and meaningfully
attempt to reorganize. In addition, particularly in larger cases, the protection
of an independent investigation of relevant issues, or, in appropriate cases,
monitoring or operation by an independent third party, can add credibility
to the Chapter 11 process when any significant party in interest has reason
to be uncomfortable with the protection provided by the debtor-in-possession
and the committee structure.
This Article first describes briefly the issues that are presented by the
debtor-in-possession construct and discusses why input by an independent
third party may sometimes be useful. The Article then reviews the statutory
provisions and the legislative history concerning the use of trustees and
examiners and concludes that, although Chapter 11 affords a court
considerable flexibility in deciding whether to order the appointment of a
trustee or examiner, Congress intended that, at least in larger cases, the
input of an independent third party would be available at the request of any
party in interest. Finally, the Article illustrates the considerable flexibility
accorded to courts in assigning duties to a trustee or examiner, reviewing
some of the circumstances under which trustees or examiners have been
employed in Chapter 11 cases. In this regard, the Article suggests that broad
and flexible use of trustees and examiners can assist in validating the
Chapter 11 process and in providing creditors and other constituencies with
confidence that their rights will be protected.
I. THE DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION CONSTRUCT

In most Chapter 11 cases, the debtor remains in possession of the
business and continues to oversee operation of the business." Indeed,
courts have recognized a strong presumption that the debtor is entitled to
remain in possession of the estate. The debtor also retains, for at least
some period, the exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan.13 Thus,
the debtor retains significant control over both the business and the
reorganization.
Early in a Chapter 11 case the debtor-in-possession makes various
business decisions, albeit often subject to court approval, that may affect the
rights of different parties as well as the viability of the business. In general,
these decisions are part of an early evaluation of whether the business
should be continued or liquidated.

11. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1988).
12. -See, e.g., Committee of Dalkon Shield Claimants v. A.H. Robins Co., 828 F.2d
239 (4th Cir. 1987); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1990).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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For example, if the business is to be continued, even temporarily, the
debtor will typically have to arrange quickly postpetition financing. 4 This
may involve offering priority or liens to a new lender at the expense of
prepetition creditors.' 5 The debtor may also have to determine whether to
assume or reject leases of nonresidential real property in the early stages of
the case.' 6 In general, the debtor may need to make commitments to
suppliers, employees, and others dependent on the debtor, in order to
maintain the ongoing business. These commitments will often create firstpriority administrative expenses that will have to be paid prior to any
recovery by prepetition general creditors.
As the case continues, the debtor is an integral part of the process of
evaluating the continued viability of the business. The debtor will often seek
to improve its operations by restructuring or streamlining them, disposing
of inefficient assets and, perhaps, certain business lines.17 Naturally,
current managers may tend towards optimism about the debtor's prospects,
particularly if their positions depend on the continued existence of the
debtor. Therefore, the debtor's restructuring plans and projections for the
success of future operations must be carefully evaluated. Yet the debtor
maintains significant control over the information available to creditors
seeking to analyze those plans and projections. Moreover, because the
debtor determines what actions it will take, albeit subject to court approval,
the debtor's business plan is ultimately dependent on management's
willingness and ability to move in a particular direction.' 8
Through the debtor's exclusive right to propose a plan, the debtor-inpossession also maintains significant control over the plan process. Although
the debtor negotiates with the various constituencies to attempt to reach
agreement on a reorganization plan, the debtor's exclusivity represents a
lever that enables the debtor to exert pressure on the various constituencies.
The debtor's exclusivity also provides some structure for the negotiations,
with the debtor often taking the lead in bringing together various creditor
constituencies.
The debtor-in-possession construct may change the nature of management's obligations.' 9 In Chapter 11, managers who previously may have
been obligated primarily to shareholders owe obligations to creditors and,
14. See id. § 364.
15. See id.

16. See id. § 365(d)(3), (4) (requiring trustee or debtor-in-possession to perform
under nonresidential leases of real property and, unless court extends time, to assume or

reject within 60 days after the order for relief).
17. See generally Frost, supra note 6, at 93.
18. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 692-93.
19. See generally Kelch, supra note 6; Frost, supra note 6; Nimmer & Feinberg,

supra note 1.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/8
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some would argue, a broad range of other constituencies who may be
interested in the reorganization and survival of the enterprise.'o
Yet these various constituencies have relatively little control over the
debtor-in-possession, notwithstanding their interest in the debtor's efforts to
alleviate its financial difficulty. The debtor's prebankruptcy board of
directors typically remains in place during the reorganization effort and
continues to oversee the operation of the business. The prebankruptcy
managers may also be able to remain in their positions during the case, even
if creditors might prefer different managers."1 Thus, members of these
constituencies may develop the perception that the debtor-in-possession is
not operated primarily for their benefit, notwithstanding any change in
management's fiduciary duty.
Moreover, the various constituencies may have inconsistent interests
that cannot all be satisfied by the debtor-in-possession in any event. 2 The
debtor-in-possession must rationalize its obligations to a broad range of
constituencies and sail through the shoals of competing interests. These
competing interests may exist among constituencies, such as in disputes
between senior and junior creditors; or they may exist within constituencies,
such as when some creditors might be subject to avoidance actions while
others would benefit from the actions. Because the debtor-in-possession has
its own interest in the reorganization, its attempts to rationalize competing
concerns may be suspect even when it is in fact acting with the highest
motives.

20. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355
(1985) ("If a debtor remains in possession, the debtor's directors have essentially the
same fiduciary obligations to creditors and shareholders as would the trustee for a debtor

out of possession. The willingness to leave the debtors in possession 'is premised upon
an assurance that the officers and managing employees can be depended upon to carry
out the fiduciary responsibility of a trustee.'"). Among the other constituencies are
employees, suppliers, communities, governments, customers and others. See generally
Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values:A JurisprudenceofBankruptcy, 91 COLuM.
L. REV. 717 (1991); Elizabeth E. Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 775

(1987).
21. Evidence exists that management turnover may be significant, particularly in
larger cases. See, e.g., LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 723; Gilson, supranote

1.
22. For example, if the liquidation value of the debtor is sufficient to satisfy senior
creditors, those creditors may want the debtor liquidated so that they can be paid in full

even if junior creditors (or equity holders) would suffer in a liquidation. Similarly, junior
creditors, who might receive little or nothing in a liquidation, may want the debtor to
continue the business and take risks that might yield large rewards, because the junior

creditors would have little to lose. Such losses would fall on the senior creditors, who
might have been satisfied out of the proceeds of an early liquidation. See LoPucki &
Whitford, supra note 1, at 683-88.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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Under the prior Bankruptcy Act, the court took an active role in the
management and monitoring of a debtor-in-possession and could protect and
rationalize the interests of various constituencies. 3 The 1978 bankruptcy
revision narrowed the court's role and largely removed judges from administrative matters in order to retain their impartiality in deciding matters
brought before them. Thus, under the Bankruptcy Code judges are generally
limited to deciding disputes brought before them and are not expected to
become actively involved in the administration or investigation of debtors-inpossession."
Although the Code requires that a court approve various business
decisions made by the debtor-in-possession, the debtor maintains the ability
to determine, to a considerable extent, which issues are placed before the
court. For example, the court will not be asked to approve an agreement
unless the debtor or some other party reaches an agreement that needs court
approval. Thus, the court will generally be less able to induce affirmative
actions by the debtor than to react to courses of action proposed by the
debtor. Moreover, the court's limited involvement with the administration
of the debtor may prevent the court from obtaining all of the information
necessary to enable it to protect the rights and interests of the various parties
in the case. Consequently, one effect of removing the court from the
management of the debtor is that the court's ability to protect the interests
of the various constituencies is reduced.'
One protection provided to creditors, and at times to equity holders, is
the availability of a committee to represent the constituency.26 A committee

23. See Bankruptcy Act § 39, 11 U.S.C. § 67 (1976) (repealed 1978). See generally
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 4, at 88-91, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 604953.
24. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 4, at 107-09, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.

at 6068-70.
25. Courts have recognized that removal of the court from active management of the
debtor does not mean that the court has no role in assuring that cases move along
promptly and fairly. In United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 808 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 484 U.S. 365
(1988), the court observed:
We do not believe ... that Congress... intended to relieve the bankruptcy
judge of the responsibility of managing the cases before him in such a way as
to promote the objectives and goals of the Bankruptcy Code.... [We think
that each bankruptcy judge is called upon to manage the cases in front of him,
fairly and impartially, in such a way as to promote their orderly and prompt
disposition.
Id. at 373-74.
26. In some cases, additional committees may also be appointed. 11 U.S.C. §
1102(a)(1988). The United States trustee also monitors certain aspects of the reorganization effort. See supra note 10.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/8
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can, and usually does, protect the interests of its constituency generally. It
can monitor the debtor, reviewing the debtor's ongoing operations as well
as the debtor's future business plan. It negotiates with the debtor in an
attempt to devise a consensual reorganization plan. In general, the
committees are intended not only to provide oversight of the debtor-inpossession, but also to represent the constituency.
However, although a committee has the power to "consult with the...
debtor-in-possession concerning the administration of the case"27 and to
investigate virtually any matter "relevant to the case or to the formulation
of a plan,"28 the debtor-in-possession typically retains significant informational and practical advantages that enable it to maintain considerable control
over its operations. Also, a committee is not involved in the day-to-day
operations of the debtor and is often in the position of responding to
initiatives generated by the debtor. Its information comes primarily from the
debtor and may reflect the debtor's sometimes unduly optimistic assessments. Accordingly, a committee usually cannot set the direction of the
business or the tone of the operations.
Moreover, even when a committee can overcome the informational and
practical advantages of the debtor-in-possession, it may not be able
adequately to serve the interests of various members of its constituency.
Members of a constituency do not necessarily have a unity of interest;
actions seen as beneficial by one member may be viewed as detrimental by
another.29 In the absence of an effective means of resolving disputes among
the constituents, a committee may not be able adequately to insist on actions
that are in the best interest of the estate, as opposed to a dominant
constituent.30
Also, particularly in smaller cases, the available resources may be
insufficient to support the active participation of a committee. This situation
may leave management effectively in complete control of the operation.31

27. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1).
28. Id. § 1103(c)(2).

29. For example, creditors who are the recipients of voidable preferences will prefer
that the debtor not pursue those claims, while other creditors would of course benefit
from successful pursuit. If the preferred creditors dominate a creditors' committee, the
committee may be less likely to vigorously seek pursuit of the preference claims.
30. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of CorporateVoting in Chapter
11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REv. 461 (1992) (arguing that voting power over
significant decisions by the debtor-in-possession may not be properly allocated under the
current version of Chapter 11).
31. See, e.g., Jerome R. Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control:A Casefor Adoption
of the Trustee System, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 159, 183 (1987) (creditors' committees active
in less than half of Chapter 11 cases studied); Susan Jensen-Conklin, Do Confirmed
Chapter 11 Plans Consummate? The Results of a Study and Analysis of the Law, 97
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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Unless the management of the debtor-in-possession can effectively and
convincingly make the transition from shareholder representatives to
representatives of a broader constituency, and unless management is capable
of managing and effecting the reorganization of the business, the real parties
in interest in the Chapter 11 case may in fact not be well served (or may at
least believe that they are not being well served) by the debtor-in-possession
construct. In those instances in which management is unable satisfactorily
to convince the various constituencies that it has made the necessary
transition, or in which management is incapable of properly managing and
reorganizing the business, there is a need to protect the interests of the
affected constituencies while preserving the reorganization effort.
When a committee cannot adequately provide that protection, Chapter
11 offers protection through the use of an independent third party who can
investigate, monitor, assist, and, in appropriate cases, manage the debtor.
The Bankruptcy Code provides two methods of introducing an independent
third party to protect the various constituencies when it appears that neither
current management nor the committee structure will adequately represent
the various interests. First, the court may, under certain circumstances,
order the appointment of a trustee to manage the debtor and conduct its
reorganization.3 2 Second, the court may order the appointment of an
examiner to investigate matters of concern to parties and, perhaps, to serve
other appropriate roles in the administration of the case. 3 Although
trustees or examiners have been appointed in a wide variety of bankruptcy
cases, the appropriate use of these independent third parties remains the
subject of some dispute and uncertainty.34

COM. L.J. 297, 326 (1992) (survey of Chapter 11 cases in Poughkeepsie, N.Y. found
that creditors' committees were appointed in only 49% of cases in sample in which

Chapter 11 plan was confirmed).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988).
33. Id. § 1104(b).
34. Some courts have recognized a third possible replacement for the debtor-in-

possession in the form of a "responsible person." See, e.g., In re FSC Corp., 38 B.R.
346 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983); In re Lifeguard Indus., 37 B.R. 3 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1983); In re UNR Indus., 30 B.R. 609 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983). Appointment of a
"responsible person" may enable a court (1)to avoid the disinterestedness requirements
for trustees and examiners, (2)to permit the debtor to retain its exclusive period to file
a plan, and (3) to avoid the U.S. trustee's appointment of the person to run the business.
See generally Kelch, supra note 6, at 1328.
Some courts have appointed independent third parties, who were not trustees or
examiners, to serve more limited roles in the case. For example, in the Integrated
Resources bankruptcy, the court appointed Professor Karen Gross as "Special Repre-

sentative" to review notices and orders in the case and "to inform the Court when in
[her] judgment a proposed order or any other proposed judicial act of the Court would

constitute an improper exercise of jurisdiction over [non-debtor limited partners]." In re
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/8

10

Zaretsky: Trustees and Examiners in Chapter 11
1993]

TRUSTEES AND EXAMINERS
II. BACKGROUND OF TRUSTEE AND EXAMINER PROVISIONS OF

CHAPTER 11
A review of the history of the trustee and examiner provisions of
Chapter 11 may assist in determining their scope and in analyzing the roles
for trustees and examiners. this review illustrates that the importance of an
independent third party to operate, oversee, or investigate the debtor-inpossession was recognized throughout the deliberations over the Bankruptcy
Code. The history of the Code provisions suggests an intention to authorize
the use of trustees and examiners under a broad range of circumstances in
which the intervention of an independent third party could protect the
interests of the various constituencies in the case.
A. PriorBankruptcy Act
Under the prior Bankruptcy Act, business reorganizations were
governed by two separate chapters-Chapters X and XI. Chapter X was
intended to deal with larger, public company reorganizations, while Chapter
XI was intended to deal with more limited reorganizations of, in many
instances, smaller companies.
Because Chapter X dealt primarily with larger, public companies and
more complicated debt and equity structures, there was considerable concern
with protecting the investing public in the reorganization process. Thus,
Chapter X provided for the exercise of independent control over a
reorganizing debtor and also provided broader remedies for the debtor.
As part of the effort to increase control over the debtor and to protect
public investors, Chapter X required the appointment of a trustee in most
cases. 3" Under the mandatory trustee provision, the trustee became "the

Integrated Resources, Inc., No. 90B-10411 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1990 and May
10, 1990). In the Zale bankruptcy, a "mediator" was appointed to assist in the
negotiations. In re Zale Corp., No. 392-30001-SAF-11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Nov. 4,
1992). Similarly, in the El Paso Electric bankruptcy, a "mediator" was appointed to
assist in "mov[ing] this case to a successful conclusion." DAILY BANKR. REV., Jan. 27,
1993, at 1.
35. Bankruptcy Act § 156, 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1976) (repealed 1978). The full text of
§ 156 provided as follows:
Upon the approval of a petition, the judge shall, if the indebtedness of a

debtor, liquidated as to amount and not contingent as to liability, is $250,000
or over, appoint one or more trustees. Any trustee appointed under this
chapter shall be disinterested and shall have the qualifications prescribed in

section 45 of this Act, except that the trustee need not reside or have his
office within the district. If such indebtedness is less than $250,000, the judge

may appoint one or more such trustees or he may continue the debtor in
possession. In any case where a trustee is appointed the judge may, for the
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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purposes specified in section 189 of this Act, appoint as an additional trustee
a person who is a director, officer, or employee of the debtor.
Id.
Bankruptcy Rule 10-202 required the court promptly to appoint, sua sponte, one or
more trustees if the debtor's indebtedness, as described in § 156, was $250,000 or more.
If the indebtedness was less than $250,000, the court could either appoint a trustee(s) or
continue the debtor in possession. Bankr. R. 10-202(a).
Congress enacted the provision for a mandatory trustee in response to perceived
abuses under the equity receiverships that were used to reorganize business enterprises
prior to enactment of Chapters X and XI. The Bankruptcy Commission, referring to an
SEC study of the issue, described the basic problem as follows:
[O]nly the sense of loyalty which a representative feels for those for
whom he acts can assure adherence to high standards of fiduciary responsibility. Such loyalty in turn requires a disinterested passion for the interests he
guards.
The Protective Committee [SEC] Study found that too frequently the
greatest flaw in the reorganization techniques of the day was lack of this
disinterested spirit:
Reorganizers have at times had objectives not only different from
but incompatible with those of investors. Reorganizers have frequently been interested in expeditious reorganizations not primarily to
avoid expense, not necessarily because of the desire to have dividend
and interest payments quickly resumed, but largely because of their
desire to consummate a reorganization of their own liking. Reorganizers frequently have not been concerned, in the manner of
investors, with economy in reorganization, as economy would
interfere with their profits. Reorganizers at times have not been
interested in fair reorganizations, since fairness might seriously
intrude into their own plans and affairs. Reorganizers at times have
not desired honest reorganizations, in the investors' sense of the
word, because such reorganizations would be costly to them. They
have been motivated by other factors. And they have endeavored-in
large measure with success-to mould the reorganization processes
so as to serve their own objectives.
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 251 (1973).
Interestingly, even mandatory appointment of a trustee did not mean that
management was necessarily displaced for all purposes. Section 156 went on to state, "In
any case where a trustee is appointed the judge may, for the purposes specified in section
189 of this Act, appoint as an additional trustee a person who is a director, officer, or
employee of the debtor." Bankruptcy Act § 156, 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1976) (repealed
1978).
It appears that the provision for the appointment of more than one trustee, including
a director, officer, or employee, was intended to permit a banruptcy court to appoint
an independent trustee and then to appoint a current manager as a "co-trustee." By
retaining current management even after the appointment of a trustee, the court could
reduce the interference with normal business operations that would arise if a new
management team were imposed on the debtor immediately after the filing of the Chapter
X petition.
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key figure in the reorganization process. "36 The trustee was generally
authorized to operate the debtor's business, to investigate the debtor's
affairs, to pursue causes of action on behalf of the estate, and to provide
information to creditors and stockholders. The trustee was also responsible
for developing, in consultation with creditors and stockholders, a reorganization plan. In this respect, the trustee provided structure to the case by
serving as "the focal point about which formulation of the plan revolve[d].
Chapter XI was intended to address those situations in which debt and
equity structures were less complicated and public investors were not likely
to be seriously affected. Thus, Chapter XI provided less control over the
debtor and more limited remedies. Appointment of a trustee was unavailable

However, § 156 contained an inherent conflict that troubled some courts faced with
the appointment of current managers as trustees. The section provided that "[a]ny trustee
appointed under this chapter shall be disinterested." Id. Section 158 provided that a
person was not disinterested if, inter alia, "he is, or was within two years prior to the
date of the filing of the petition, a director, officer, or employee of the debtor."
Bankruptcy Act § 158(3), 11 U.S.C. § 558(3) (1976) (repealed 1978). Thus, although
§ 156 expressly provided for the appointment of officers, employees, or directors, the
disinterestedness requirement seemed to preclude their appointment.
Some courts resolved the conflict by authorizing an officer, employee, or director
(those parties explicitly described in § 156) to serve as an additional trustee notwithstanding the disinterestedness requirement. See, e.g., In re Ocean City Auto. Bridge Co., 184
F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1950); Meredith v. Thralls, 144 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1944). Nevertheless, even those courts subjected officers, employees, or directors to the remaining
requirements of disinterestedness (other than officer, employee, or director status) so that
an officer, employee, or director that held any interest materially adverse to any class
of creditors or stockholders might be precluded from becoming a trustee. Interestingly,
Bankruptcy Rule 10-202(a), which provided for the appointment of a trustee or trustees,
omitted the language authorizing the appointment of officers, employees, and directors.
In any event, it seems clear that the trustee could employ officers of the debtor, although
their compensation was subject to approval of the court. Bankruptcy Act § 191, 11
U.S.C. § 591 (1976) (repealed 1978). See generally 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
7.04, 8.14 (14th ed. 1978).
36. 6

COLLIER ON

BANKRUPTCY, supra note 35,

0.09, at 105.

37. Id. at 106. Chapter X also contained a provision for the appointment of an
examiner. Bankruptcy Act § 168, 11 U.S.C. § 568 (1976) (repealed 1978). Appointment
of an examiner was authorized in any case in which a trustee was not appointed. In
general, an examiner under Chapter X was required to investigate and report on the
affairs of the debtor. Under the Bankruptcy Rules the court could also require an
examiner to prepare and file a plan. Because appointment of a trustee was mandatory in
most cases, examiners served a minor role under Chapter X. Nevertheless, the examiner
provision represented a recognition of the value of an independent third party in a
reorganization case, even in a case that was too small to justify the appointment of a
trustee. See generally ALEXANDER L. PAsKAY, HANDBOOK FOR TRUSTEES AND
RECEIVERS IN BANKRUPTCY § 1.003 (1978).
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in Chapter XI. Instead, the debtor generally remained in possession,
managing the business and pursuing the reorganization effort. 8 Although
Chapter XI contained provision for the appointment of a receiver, 39 the
debtor generally remained in possession unless a particular reason existed
to divest the debtor of possession and to appoint a receiver.40
Although Chapter X may have authorized the retention of current
management even after the appointment of a trustee,4 ' in most cases
management was displaced by the trustee. The perception that management
would be displaced in Chapter X induced reorganizing debtors at least to
attempt to reorganize under Chapter XI, where they could remain in
possession and control of the business.42 This practice supported the view
that if appointment of a trustee was mandatory, debtors would not com38. See 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 35, 5.08. Bankruptcy Rule 1118(b) provided that "if no trustee in bankruptcy has previously qualified, the debtor shall

continue in possession." Bankr. R. 11-18(b).
39. Bankruptcy Act § 332, 11 U.S.C. § 732 (1976) (repealed 1978); see also Bankr.
R. 11-18(b) ("On application of any party in interest, the court may, for cause shown,
appoint a receiver to take charge of the property and operate the business of the
debtor.").
40. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 35, 5.08.
41. See supra note 35.
42. See, e.g., SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965); General
Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956); SEC v. United States Realty &
Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940).
The Banlauptcy Commission described the preference for Chapter XI as follows:
The reason underlying the preference of lawyers for Chapter XI is
obvious, although not often stated. A debtor initiates a Chapter XI proceeding,
and only the debtor can propose a plan under Chapter XI. The debtor is
normally allowed to operate the business. A concomitant of continued
management is the continuation of the employment of the debtor's attorney.
On the other hand, if a Chapter X proceeding is initiated, a disinterested
trustee is appointed and counsel for the debtor has a greatly reduced function.
Although proponents of Chapter XI generally talk about speed and economy,
control and the "best interests" test obviously are the dominating reasons for
the preference. The obvious advantages of Chapter XI to the debtor and his
counsel have led to its use by large corporations. This has caused litigation as
to the propriety of the use of Chapter XI, primarily generated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission's filing a section 328 application.
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws is of the opinion that the
conclusions and recommendations of the protective committee study and the
Congressional policy embodied in the Chandler Act are still valid. Unfortunately, the creation of several chapters for reorganization has substantially
frustrated the reform achieved by Chapter X, since Chapter XI can usually be
utilized. Chapter XI has the same potential for abuse as the equity receivership.
H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 35, at 247-48.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/8
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mence reorganization proceedings until they were forced to do so-a time
that might be too late to salvage the business.43 Consequently, the mandatory trustee provision of Chapter X became one of the most troublesome
aspects of that reorganization remedy.
B. Bankruptcy Commission Report
In 1973, a Commission established by Congress" issued a report
evaluating the Bankruptcy Act and recommending changes in the Act.
Among the issues the Commission studied were whether the different business rehabilitation chapters should be merged and, pertinent to the matter at
hand, what role trustees and examiners should serve in a merged proceeding.
Under the Commission's proposal, the main task of operating and,
ultimately, reorganizing the debtor would fall generally on the debtor-inpossession. Although the Commission recognized that trustees could serve
a useful role in some reorganization cases, it rejected the Chapter X concept
of a mandatory trustee. In the Commission's view, the idea of an independent trustee was "sound," but had its limitations. Because a trustee was
viewed as a party that normally would operate the business, ousting existing
management, mandatory appointment of a trustee could cause inefficiencies.
Moreover, mandatory displacement of existing management could deter
some debtors from filing for reorganization at a time when the business
could realistically be reorganized." The Commission was comfortable with
the debtor-in-possession concept, in part because its proposed statute
contained provisions for an administrative agency that could independently
investigate the debtor and serve as a watchdog over the reorganization pro46
cess.
Nevertheless, the Commission's proposed statute authorized the court
to order the appointment of a trustee on application of the administrator4 7

43. See id. at 253 ("[The mandatory trustee provision] also has probably been a factor
in delaying the commencement of reorganizations, to the ultimate detriment of security
holders.").
44. The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States was established by
Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970). Its charge was to "'study, analyze, evaluate,
and recommend changes' in the Bankruptcy Act." H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 35,
at 1.
45. H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 35, at 249-53.
46. Id. at 253.
47. In order to understand fully the Commission's approach to trustees and examiners,
it is necessary to review the Commission's proposal for an administrator to oversee the
bankruptcy system. The administrator the Commission sought would have been somewhat
similar to, but more powerful than, the United States trustee. The Commission described
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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or any party in interest. In larger cases involving corporations with debts of
$1,000,000 or more and 300 or more security holders, the Commission
proposed a presumption that appointment of a trustee would be warranted
unless the court found "that the protection afforded by a trustee is unnecessary or that the expense would be disproportionate to the protection

the duties of the administrator in reorganization cases as follows:
Chapter VII of the proposed Act assigns a number of administrative
functions to the administrator that are now given to judges of courts of
bankruptcy in cases under Chapter X, including the following: authorization
of the operation of a debtor's business; appointment of a receiver to conduct
the business; appointment of trustees (subject to court approval); receipt and
custody of reports and records of the debtor's property and operations;
authorization of the issuance of certificates of indebtedness; issuance of
notices to creditors,'equity security holders, and other parties interest; calling
and conducting meetings of creditors and equity security holders; authorization of the employment of attorneys and accountants by the trustee; policing
compliance by representatives of creditors and equity security holders with
statutory provisions and rules regulating solicitation of proxies and other
activities on behalf of those whom they represent; authorization of the lease
or sale of property when in the ordinary course of business; determination of
the manner of proving claims; designation of classes of creditors and equity
security holders; determination of the schedule for filing plans and modifications, transmission of plans to creditors and equity security holders, and for
filing acceptances; and determining the mode of carrying out a confirmed
plan ....
The administrator will not, however, in cases under Chapter VII, perform
the duties and exercise the rights and powers of a trustee, since it is not
contemplated that the administrator will have the staff able to carry out these
responsibilities when the management of a debtor undergoing reorganization
is displaced. The administrator will, nevertheless, perform the functions now
delegated to the Securities and Exchange Commission in Chapter X cases of
the present Act, including the preparation of an advisory report on proposed
plans and the recommendation of compensation to be allowed trustees,
attorneys, and accountants.
Finally, there are functions assigned the administrator under Chapter VII
that are not now performed by any official, including the appointment of
members of committees of creditors and equity security holders as provided
in section 7-101 and the allowance to an individual debtor under Chapter VII
of an amount from his postpetition income for support of himself and his

family.
Id. at 124-25.
Because under the Commission's proposal the administrator was authorized to
perform the investigatory functions of a trustee, there was no need for the appointment
of an examiner. However, the administrator was authorized to delegate the investigatory
duties to "a disinterested person, whose selection shall be subject to approval of the
court." H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 7-103(b), at 221 (1975). Apparently that
disinterested person would have served as an examiner in all but name.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/8
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afforded. -48 Interestingly, the Commission's proposal provided no standard
for determining whether to appoint a trustee in smaller cases.
C. CongressionalAction
The Commission's proposal was introduced in Congress, as was an
alternative bill proposed by the National Conference of Bankruptcy
Judges.4 9 Although there were significant differences between the two bills,
their provisions with respect to trustee appointments were similar.5" Both
granted the court considerable discretion in deciding whether to order the
appointment of a trustee. However, they created a presumption in favor of
appointment of a trustee in larger cases.
These proposals, which sought the elimination of a mandatory trustee
in larger cases, drew the strong opposition of the SEC.51 Others were

48. H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 35, at 25 (proposed § 7-102(a)).
49. The Commission's proposed bill was introduced in the 93d Congress as H.R.
10792 and S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and was reintroduced in the 94th

Congress as H.R. 31 and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The Judges' bill was
introduced inthe 93d Congress as H.R. 16643 and S. 4060, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973),
and was reintroduced in the 94th Congress as H.R. 32 and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975). The bills received intensive consideration in the 94th Congress.
50. Section 7-102(a) of H.R. 31 provided as follows:

On the application of the administrator or any party in interest, and after
hearing on notice, the court may order the administrator to appoint a trustee.
If the debtor is a corporation having debts of $1,000,000 or more and three

hundred or more security holders, the administrator shall apply to the court
to determine whether a trustee should be appointed, and the court shall order
such appointment unless it finds that the protection afforded by a trustee is
unnecessary or that the expense would be disproportionate to the protection
afforded.

H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7-102(a), at 191 (1975).
Section 7-102(a) of H.R. 32 provided as follows:
On the application of any party in interest, the court may, when necessary
in the best interest of the estate, order the Director to appoint a trustee to take

charge of the property and operate the business of the debtor. If the debtor is
a corporation having debts of $1,000,000 or more and three hundred of more
security holders, the Director shall appoint a trustee unless the debtor on
application obtains from the court an order finding that the protection afforded

by a trustee in unnecessary and that the expense would be disproportionate to
the protection afforded.
H.R. 32, supra note 47, §7-102(a), at 218.
51. See Report of Securities and Exchange Comm'n on S. 235 and S. 236, Hearings
on S.235 and S.236 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the

Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess, pt. II, at 738, 749-54 (1975)
[hereinafter SEC Report].
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equally opposed to any mandatory appointment of a trustee in reorganization
cases. 2 After extensive hearings and debate on the proposed bills, new
proposals were introduced in the 95th Congress. The bills introduced in the
House and the Senate differed considerably with respect to the use of
independent third parties in reorganization cases.
The House bill called for a cost-benefit analysis of whether a trustee
should be appointed. It provided that, upon the request of a party in interest
or the United States trustee, a trustee could be appointed, but only upon a
showing that "(1) the protection afforded by a trustee is needed; and (2) the
costs and expenses of a trustee would not be disproportionately higher than
the value of the protection afforded."" The bill pointedly did not require
the appointment of a trustee, providing only that upon a proper showing the
court "may" order the appointment. According to the House Report,
testimony had strongly indicated that too frequent appointment of trustees
might delay debtors' bankruptcy filings until they are beyond the ability to
reorganize successfully. The Report indicated that a trustee would properly
be appointed "only if the protection afforded by a trustee is needed and the
costs and expenses of a trustee would not be higher than the protection
afforded. "
The House bill also provided for the appointment of an examiner under
standards identical to those applicable to the appointment of a trustee. Of
course, since the costs of an examiner would normally be considerably less
than the costs of a trustee, the value of the protection would presumably not
need to be as high as would be needed for a trustee. Thus, it appears that
the examiner was viewed as the less drastic alternative when third-party
intervention seemed desirable.55
The Senate bill required the appointment of a trustee in "public
company" cases. 56 A "public company" was defined as "a debtor who,
within twelve months prior to the filing of a petition for relief under this
chapter, had outstanding liabilities of $5,000,000 or more, exclusive of
liabilities for goods, services, or taxes and not less than 1,000 security

52. See, e.g., Hearingson H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
ConstitutionalRights of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. IV, at
2475, 2478-79 (1977).

53. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 1104(a), at 180-81 (1977).
54. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 4, at 402, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at

6359.
55. The examiner's role under the House bill was "to conduct such an investigation
of the debtor as is appropriate." H.R. 8200, supranote 53, § 1104(b), at 181. However,
as with the current Bankruptcy Code, the examiner would also perform any duties of a

trustee that the court ordered the debtor-in-possession not to perform. Id. § 1106(b), at
183-84.
56. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1104(a) (1977).
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holders." 57 In other cases, the bill provided that the court "may" order the
election of a trustee or appoint a trustee "for cause" and that the court
"shall" order the appointment of a trustee "if such appointment would be in
the interests of the estate and security holders. ""
The Senate bill also provided for the appointment of an examiner under
certain circumstances. The standard for appointment of an examiner was
particularly flexible. The bill provided that the court "may" order the
appointment of an examiner to conduct such an investigation "as is
appropriate." It also provided that the court "shall" order the appointment
of an examiner "if such appointment would serve the interests of the estate
and security holders.""
Eventually, the House and Senate reached a compromise with respect
to the use of independent third parties in bankruptcy proceedings. Under the
compromise, the Senate's reference to a mandatory trustee in public
company cases was eliminated. Instead, the final conference version of the
bill seems to have contained a provision requiring the appointment of an
examiner in public company cases.' Thus, the mandatory trustee was
apparently replaced with a mandatory examiner.
However, this provision was changed once again, at the last minute, to
require a request by a party in interest before an examiner would be
appointed, even in those cases that the Senate would have described as
public company cases. Apparently, the final provision meant that an
examiner would be available in large public cases as long as any party in
interest requested one. This was the last vestige of Senate's insistence on an
independent third party in public company cases.
It appears that the compromise version was intended to recognize that
a firm rule either requiring the appointment of a trustee or examiner, or

57. Id. § 1101(3).
58. Id. § 1104(b).

59. Id. § 1104(c). The duties of an examiner under the Senate bill were identical to
the duties under the House bill. Id. § 1106(b).
Interestingly, neither bill adopted the Bankruptcy Commission's proposal for an
administrator with a broad mandate to oversee the reorganization effort; however, the

House bill did provide for a United States trustee with some of the duties that the
Commission would have assigned to its administrator. These duties did not contain the
broad investigative mandate or oversight functions envisioned by the Commission.
Consequently, a debtor-in-possessionretained extensive control over both information and
case management except to the extent that an active creditors' committee might monitor
the debtor and the proceedings.
60. Prior to the final changes in the legislation, in describing the compromises agreed

to between the House and the Senate, Senator DeConcini indicated that the final bill
called for the automatic appointment of an examiner in large public cases. 124 CONG.
REc. 33989, 34003 (1978).
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refusing such an appointment, in every reorganization case would neither
promote efficient and economical reorganization nor protect creditors and
the public interest from mismanagement, fraud, misdealing, or unfairness.
Congress was apparently seeking to balance the perceived need for an
independent third party to protect the interests of creditors, equity holders,
and the public, with the desire to facilitate the reorganization effort, by
encouraging the debtor to commence a case while the debtor could still be
saved and by leaving in place those managers familiar with the business and
its creditors. Congress sought flexible provisions that could inject an
independent third party into the process where such intervention would
reasonably assist in assuring that the various constituencies are well served,
while not requiring a third party in all cases. 6' It also sought to protect
constituents in larger cases by making available an independent third party
when a party in interest felt a need for independent input.
III. THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. Trustee Appointments
One means of bringing an independent third party into a Chapter 11
case is through the appointment of a trustee. A trustee normally operates the
business and is generally required to perform certain duties, such as filing
reports and schedules, investigating the debtor's affairs, and filing a
reorganization plan.62 In effect, the trustee normally replaces the debtor-in-

61. See, e.g., In re Lenihan, 4 B.R. 209 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1980).

62. 11 U.S.C. § 1106 (1988). Section 1106, which prescribes the duties of trustees
and examiners in reorganizations, provides as follows:
(a) A trustee shall(1) perform the duties of a trustee specified in section 704(2), 704(5),
704(7), 704(8), and 704(9) of this title;
(2) if the debtor has not done so, file the list, schedule, and statement
required under section 521(1) of this title;
(3) except to the extent that the court orders otherwise, investigate the
acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the
operation of the debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance of
such business, and any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation
of a plan;
(4) as soon as practicable(A) file a statement of any investigation conducted under
paragraph (3) of this subsection, including any fact ascertained pertaining to
fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity
in the management of the affairs of the debtor, or to a cause of action
available to the estate; and
(B) transmit a copy or a summary of any such statement to any
creditors' committee or equity security holders' committee, to any indenture
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/8
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possession and runs both the business and the Chapter 11 case.

trustee, and to such other entity as the court designates;
(5) as soon as practicable, file a plan under section 1121 of this title, file
a report of why the trustee will not file a plan, or recommend conversion of
the case to a case under chapter 7, 12, or 13 of this title or dismissal of the
case;
(6) for any year for which the debtor has not filed a tax return required
by law, furnish, without personal liability, such information as may be
required by the governmental unit with which such tax return was to be filed,
in light of the condition of the debtor's books and records and the availability
of such information; and
(7) after confirmation of a plan, file such reports as are necessary or as
the court orders.
(b) An examiner appointed under section 1104(c) of this title shall perform the
duties specified in paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a) of this section,
and, except to the extent that the court orders otherwise, any other duties of
the trustee that the court orders the debtor in possession not to perform.
Id.
Section 704, which prescribes the duties of a trustee in a liquidation, provides as
follows:
The trustee shall(1) collect and reduce to money the property of the estate for which such
trustee serves, and close such estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the
best interests of parties in interest;
(2) be accountable for all property received;
(3) ensure that the debtor shall perform his intention as specified in
section 521(2)(B) of this title;
(4) investigate the financial affairs of the debtor;
(5) if a purpose would be served, examine proofs of claims and object to
the allowance of any claim that is improper;
(6) if advisable, oppose the discharge of the debtor;
(7) unless the court orders otherwise, furnish such information concerning
the estate and the estate's administration as is requested by a part in interest;
(8) if the business of the debtor is authorized to be operated, file with the
court, with the United States trustee, and with any governmental unit charged
with responsibility for collection or determination of any tax arising out of
such operation, periodic reports and summaries of the operation of such
business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other
information as the United States trustee or the court requires; and
(9) make a final report and file a final account of the administration of the
estate with the court and with the United States trustee.
Id. § 704.
63. The trustee's role may, however, be limited if appropriate under the circumstances. For example, a trustee need not replace managers in the day-to-day operation of the
business if the managers are competently running the business. In such a case, the trustee
might investigate the debtor and its operations and might formulate a reorganization plan,
but would not operate the debtor.
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Bankruptcy Code section 1104(a) provides that "on request of a party
in interest or the United States trustee, . . . the court shall order the
appointment of a trustee-(1) for cause . . . ; or (2) if such appointment is

in the interest of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests
of the estate."' The first basis for appointment of a trustee-cause,
including fraud or mismanagement-is intended primarily to address
shortcomings in the debtor's current management. If management has been
seriously dishonest or grossly incompetent, it would be inappropriate to
subject creditors or equity interests to continued fraud, dishonesty, or
incompetence. Consequently, a trustee is called for when management is
clearly incapable of honestly and competently managing the business and
guiding it through the reorganization process. 65
The second basis for the appointment of a trustee requires a more
generalized analysis of the interests of the creditors, any equity security
holders, and other interests of the estate. The statute offers no express
guidelines for determining when the appointment of a trustee will serve the
various interests. However, the statute is drafted to require that the
appointment be in the interest of all of the constituencies described in the
provision. Consequently, it appears that the primary criterion is whether
such an appointment would benefit the estate, rather than any particular
constituency.66
64. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a). Under section 1104(a), appointment of a trustee is not, on
its face, discretionary. The statute directs the court that it "shall" appoint a trustee under
certain circumstances, rather than that it "may" appoint one. Compare H.R. 31, supra
note 49, § 7-102, at 191 (providing that court "may" appoint trustee under certain
circumstances). However, the standards for the appointment of a trustee require the
exercise of discretionary authority. A finding of "cause" or "interests" requires the court
to exercise its discretion and good judgment. See, e.g., Committee of Dalkon Shield
Claimants v. A.H. Robins Co., 828 F.2d 239, 242 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[A] determination
of cause ...is within the discretion of the court."); see also In re Ionosphere Clubs,
Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 168 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that Congress adopted "a
flexible standard for the appointment of trustees"). Nevertheless, use of the word "shall"
instead of a more discretion-based word, such as "may," suggests that a trustee is
essential under certain circumstances and that a court should not be reluctant to order the
appointment of a trustee when a trustee appears necessary to protect the various
constituencies.
65. In In re William A. Smith Constr. Co., 77 B.R. 124 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987),
the court found cause for the appointment of a trustee when the debtor's president and
chief executive officer resigned from the company on the date the bankruptcy case was
commenced. In the absence of anyone to run the business objectively, the court had little
choice but to appoint a trustee.
66. Use of the word "and" indicates that appointment of a trustee must be in the
interest of the various constituencies. It must serve some positive purpose for the estate,
rather than simply further the interests of one constituency.
There is no requirement that particularly egregious circumstances be present.
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Courts have described various factors to be considered in determining
whether appointment of a trustee is in the interest of the parties and the
estate.67 In general, these factors seem to require a balancing of the costs
involved in a trustee appointment with the benefits to be derived from such
an appointment.6"

There are several potential costs associated with the appointment of a
trustee. First, of course, there is the cost of the trustee. However, to the
extent that the trustee replaces current managers, who were themselves
compensated for managing the business, this cost would not necessarily
increase the expenses already being incurred by the estate.69

Instead, the only limitations on the face of the provision are that a party in interest or the
United States trustee must request the appointment of a trustee and the court must look
to the interests of all concerned parties, not merely one constituency. In fact, notwithstanding the directive that a party in interest or the United States trustee must request the
appointment of a trustee, § 105 seems to authorize the court to act sua sponte if the court
believes that the standards for appointment of a trustee have been met.
The House Report describes the standard for appointment of a trustee as follows:
The twin goals of the standard for the appointment of a trustee should be
protection of the public interest and the interests of creditors, as contemplated
in current Chapter X, and facilitation of a reorganization that will benefit both
the creditors and the debtors, as contemplated in current Chapter XI.
Balancing the goals is a difficult process, and requires consideration of many
factors.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 4, at 232, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6192.
67. One court described these factors as
(i) the trustworthiness of the debtor; (ii) the debtor in possession's past and
present performance and prospects for the debtor's rehabilitation; (iii) the
confidence-or lack thereof-of the business community and of creditors in
present management; and (iv) the benefits derived by the appointment of a
trustee, balanced against the cost of the appointment.
In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. at 168 (citations omitted).
68. See, e.g., In re Parker Grande Dev. Inc., 64 B.R. 557 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1986).
The House Report described this balancing in conjunction with the House bill that
explicitly called for a cost-benefit analysis:
It may be difficult now to determine the precise contours of the standard,
because in any particular case, the projection of the cost of and the protection
afforded by a trustee will be uncertain. However, a case law will quickly
develop defining the circumstances in which a trustee should be appointed.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 4, at 234, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6194.
69. See, e.g., In re Microwave Prods. of Am., Inc., 102 B.R. 666 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. 1989) (trustee would replace outside management consultant who was costing
estate $7,500 per week). During the hearings on bankruptcy reform proposals, the
Securities and Exchange Commission recognized that, in a cost-benefit analysis, the
proper comparison is between the cost of a trustee and the value of its services to the
estate. In this regard, the SEC noted: "The trustee's compensation in reorganization is
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Similarly, although the trustee will likely need legal counsel and
perhaps the assistance of other professionals, the debtor will not normally
need counsel and professionals separate from the trustee's, so there need not
be duplication of professional expenses. Indeed, several courts have
recognized that once a trustee is appointed, the debtor's counsel is no longer
entitled to compensation from the estate, except to the extent that debtor's
counsel is performing services that benefit the estate.70 Thus, the cost need
not be quite as great as some courts have envisioned.
More significantly, there is the cost of delay and "education" as the
trustee learns about the business and the various constituencies involved in
the bankruptcy case. This delay and expense would not be incurred by
current management; it represents an extra cost attributable to the appointment of a trustee. The delay and education can be particularly costly if, as
is often the case with a Chapter 11 debtor, the debtor is at a critical juncture
requiring immediate action.
Related to this cost is the danger that management personnel who are
essential to the proper and successful functioning of the business cannot be
replaced adequately by a trustee. In smaller cases, the business may be the
creature of its owners or managers. Ousting those managers may destroy the
business if they are essential to the smooth and successful continuation of
the business. Even in larger businesses, employees, customers, and suppliers
may be familiar with current management and may be less willing to deal
with a new manager, particularly if the new manager is a bankruptcy

based on the services he renders and should represent the cost of a good executive." SEC
Report, supra note 51, at 751. The SEC continued, stating,
We do not mean to suggest that a reorganization proceeding is not expensive,
or that the trustee is only a chief executive. A trustee has broader and
different responsibilities than the chief executive of a solvent business. There
is more work to be done for which payment must be made. But the extra costs
depend on the requirements of the reorganization and the need for due process
in a court proceeding. Although the elimination of the trustee may reduce
direct administrative costs, the trustee's fee is not the principal factor in that
calculation. There is, moreover, no ultimate saving if the lack of a trustee

leads to a reorganization which is inadequate or incomplete and which results
eventually in a return engagement to the court at a later date. Finally,

additional costs may be offset if the investigation by a trustee results in
bringing back into the estate substantial assets through suits against former
management and others.

Id.
70. See, e.g., In re Xebec, 147 B.R. 518 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1992); In re Ginji Corp.,
117 B.R. 983 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1990); In re TS Indus., 125 B.R. 638 (Bankr. D. Utah
1991); cf. In re NRG Resources, Inc., 64 B.R. 643 (W.D. La. 1986) (trustee's attorney

replaces debtor's attorney); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 172 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1990) (debtor's professionals retained to represent estate).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/8
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trustee.
However, when operating management is competent to maintain day-today operations, the trustee need not actually displace that management and
delay the debtor's return to health. 71 Instead, the trustee may serve as a
general overseer, in a role similar to that of a board of directors, while
current managers maintain continuing operations.72
For example, in In re Colorado-Ute Electric Association, Inc.," the
court ordered the appointment of a trustee because there were "formidable"
conflicts among the debtor's board of directors and because the debtor's
management seemed unsuited to the task of reorganizing the debtor.
Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that, because the debtor's current
management was capable of maintaining the day-to-day operations of the
debtor, "the trustee may determine to retain current management throughout
this case to operate the debtor, and to assist and support the trustee. "I
Similarly, in In re CardinalIndustries, Inc.,' the court ordered the
appointment of a trustee after various creditor constituencies lost confidence
in management's ability to generate accurate financial information, to
determine impartially an appropriate business direction for the debtor, or
ultimately to effect successfully a reorganization of the debtor. Nevertheless,

71. See, e.g., In re Cardinal Indus., 109 B.R. 755, 766 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); In
re Microwave Prods. of Am., 102 B.R. 666, 676 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1989); In re
Parker Grande Dev., Inc., 64 B.R. 557, 561 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1986); see also In re
Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 B.R. 781 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (trustee appointed in
.watch dog" capacity, debtor's managers retained to run day-to-day operations).
72. In analyzing the cost of a trustee, courts seem to have lost sight of the two very
different roles that a trustee might serve in a reorganization case: (1) management of the
business and (2) general oversight of the case. In the various proposals for mandatory
appointment of a trustee, proponents recognized that a trustee need not, in all cases,
displace current operating management. For example, in describing Senate bill 2266
which required the appointment of a trustee in cases involving "public companies,"
Senator Wallop observed:
In the very large public company case where there is great public interest and
the creditors, stockholders and interested parties may be located throughout
the country, a trustee will automatically be appointed to supervise the
proceedings. He will be able to retain the currentmanagement if he desires
but will not be required to do so.
124 CONG. REC. S14715, 514719 (1978) (emphasis added). Thus, Senator Wallop
acknowledged that a trustee may serve the role of supervisor of the proceeding, rather
than active manager, and that current operating management need not be displaced even
in those cases in which a trustee is appointed.
73. 120 B.R. 164 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
74. Id. at 177; see also In re McCordi Corp., 6 B.R. 172 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980);
qf supra note 35 (discussing prior Bankruptcy Act provisions for retention of
management).
75. 109 B.R. 755 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
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the court recognized that the debtor's current managers had skills and
knowledge related to the debtor's operations that could be useful to a
trustee. Thus, the court suggested that the managers "should be retained and
utilized by any appointed trustee."76 By authorizing the employment of
current management, the court was able to protect the rights of creditors and
other constituencies without depriving management of its authority over
many of the day-to-day operations of the business. 7
Apart from the perceived monetary costs of a trustee are related,
intangible costs that must be considered. The debtor is divested of possession and control of the business, the debtor's exclusive period to propose a
plan is terminated, and the debtor's principals generally suffer substantially
decreased influence over the reorganization effort.
In general, Chapter 11 attempts to set up a negotiating process in which
the debtor's principals can often be at the table and perhaps salvage some
role or equity in the reorganized debtor." The debtor's exclusive right to
propose a plan not only provides structure to plan negotiations, but also
affords the debtor some leverage to protect the debtor's principals. Although
a trustee may be able to serve as the lightening rod that provides some

76. Id. at 767.
77. One commentator has suggested that the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the
appointment of a "limited powers trustee." See Leonard L. Gumport, The Bankruptcy
Examiner, 20 CAL. BANKR. J. 71, 132-34 (1992). Such a trustee would be charged with
the duty of investigating the debtor and pursuing any causes of action disclosed by the
investigation. By limiting the trustee's role pursuant to sections 363(c)(1) and 1108 of the
Code, a court can engage a trustee to bring actions on behalf of the estate without ousting
a debtor's management. To the extent that a trustee both investigates and brings causes
of action, however, the trustee is subject to the same appearance of conflict Congress
sought to avoid by barring an examiner from later serving as a trustee. The investigating
trustee has incentive to find viable causes of action because pursuit of those actions is the
only role of the trustee.
Another possibility would be to place the trustee in the role of the board of
directors and to require that the trustee at least seriously consider retaining current
operating management. The trustee could then investigate the debtor, oversee management's pursuit of causes of action, and maintain general control over the reorganization
effort, while permitting current management to continue day-to-day operations.
The problem with this approach is that the managers may not feel that they have
a sufficient stake in the operation if their control has been superseded by a trustee.
However, operational managers are already subject to the control of a board of directors.
They may not object to control by a trustee instead of a board. When they do object, as
might occur particularly when operational managers and board members are the same or
related persons, a trustee may be able to create incentives to induce managers to remain
with the debtor.
78. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargainingover Equity's Share
in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 125 (1990).
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structure to plan negotiations, the Bankruptcy Code's attempt to provide
some leverage to the debtor is defeated when a trustee is appointed. Without
that leverage, the debtor's principals, as opposed to the business, are largely
excluded from the reorganization effort. This exclusion, and the likely disenfranchisement of the debtor's principals, is certainly a cost to the principals;
it is also a cost to the process of reorganizing the debtor.
Once a court determines the predicted costs of a trustee, it can weigh
them against the benefits to be gained by the appointment of a trustee in
appropriate cases. The benefits of a trustee depend on the particular facts of
each individual case. When the management of the debtor-in-possession is
competent, when it can adjust adequately to its modified fiduciary obligations, and when a creditors' committee is properly functioning, there may
be virtually no marginal value to appointment of a trustee, in which case the
cost will clearly outweigh the benefit.
On the other hand, when the debtor has engaged in fraud or has
incompetently managed the business, the benefit of a trustee is obvious. A
competent, independent third party can investigate honestly and effectively
the prior management's conduct and dealings, manage the business, and
guide the debtor through the reorganization process.
Even when the debtor has not acted fraudulently or incompetently, a
trustee may be able to diffuse tensions that may exist between current
management and creditors and generally to increase the confidence level of
the various constituencies if they are dissatisfied with current management.79 In appropriate cases, the intervention of a third party with control
over the debtor and its operations may assist meaningfully in obtaining
agreement on a reorganization plan for the debtor.
A trustee may also be able to resolve more convincingly than current
management the corporate governance and fiduciary duty issues that can
arise in a Chapter 11 case. Unlike the debtor's current management, the
trustee is not retained by a board elected by shareholders and has no history
with the various constituencies. Consequently, there is less danger that the
trustee will unfairly favor (or appear to favor) one constituency over
another.8 0 Moreover, a trustee is less likely than the prebankruptcy
managers to perceive a need to protect its own position within the business.
The trustee will not have been a previous owner of the business and is not
generally viewed as an integral part of the ongoing management of the

79. See, e.g., In re Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 B.R. 781 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(trustee appointed in part to mediate with major creditor and either propose reorganization plan or report that no plan is possible).
80. If anything, the trustee seems to be more likely to follow the absolute priority
rule, favoring senior interests over junior interests. Consequently,junior claimants rarely
seek the appointment of a trustee. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 700.
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business. Instead, once the business is successfully reorganized the trustee
will usually move on to another venture.
Although considerable benefits may sometimes flow from the appointment of a trustee, most courts, after weighing the costs and benefits,
recognize a strong presumption in favor of leaving in place the debtor-inpossession,"8 They have generally been reluctant to order the appointment
of a trustee unless there is a strong showing that the benefit to be derived
will far outweigh the costs that flow from the appointment of a trustee.
Consistent with this judicial orientation, appointment of a trustee is
typically described as an "extraordinary remedy" to be granted only on a
showing by clear and convincing evidence that the remedy is warranted.82
However, although certainly many cases exist in which the expense,
upheaval, and interference of a trustee would outweigh the benefits, the
strong presumption in favor of the debtor-in-possession may lead courts to
refuse to order the appointment of a trustee even when such an appointment
may assist meaningfully in the debtor's reorganization. In view of the
flexible role that a trustee can serve in a reorganization case, courts may,
at times, be missing an opportunity to provide increased protection and
confidence for various constituencies and to resolve in a more efficient and
economical manner the reorganization issues.
B. Examiner Appointments
A less drastic alternative for providing an independent third party in a
reorganization proceeding is the appointment of an examiner. Unlike a
trustee, an examiner does not displace the debtor-in-possession. Instead, the
examiner's statutory role is primarily investigative. The court may order the
examiner to investigate any aspect of the case or the underlying business
83
operation and to file a report of his or her findings.
Bankruptcy Code section 1104(b) provides that if the court does not
order the appointment of a trustee, it "shall order the appointment of an
examiner . . . if-(1) such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any

81. See, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 167 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1990); Committee of Dalkon Shield Claimants v. A.H. Robins Co., 828 F.2d 239, 241
(4th Cir. 1987).
82. Ionosphere Clubs, 113 B.R. 164. One commentator has argued that, in fact, a
preponderance of the evidence standard would be more appropriate because the court
could more flexibly balance the needs of creditors and shareholders against the interest
of the debtor in remaining in possession. See Gumport, supra note 77, at 106-07.
83. As courts and parties to Chapter 11 cases have begun to recognize the potential

value of limited third-party intervention, examiners, as the only statutorily sanctioned
third parties who do not displace the debtor-in-possession, have also been asked to serve
limited noninvestigative roles. See infra Part IV.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/8

28

Zaretsky: Trustees and Examiners in Chapter 11

19931

TRUSTEES AND EXAMINERS

equity security holders, and other interests of the estate; or (2) the debtor's
fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts, other than debts for goods, services, or
taxes, or owing to an insider, exceed $5,000,000." s' The first statutory
standard, "interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other
interests of the estate," mirrors the standard for the appointment of a
trustee.' As with the standard for trustee appointments, the examiner
standard looks to the collective interest of all of the constituencies described;
the interest of the estate is the primary concern under the interests test.
Apparently this standard requires a comparison of the costs and benefits of
an examiner appointment similar to that required for trustee appointments.
The costs of an examiner, however, should be significantly lower than
those of a trustee. The examiner does not generally become a manager of
the business and does not need to be compensated for a management role.
Management is not generally displaced, so the perceived delay and expense
of replacing management is not incurred. Similarly, the examiner remedy
is less severe because the debtor remains in possession of the business and
retains its exclusive right to propose a plan. Consequently, the debtor retains
the leverage accorded by exclusivity, and the plan negotiation process can
proceed in the manner envisioned by the Code.
Nevertheless, there can be significant costs attributable to the appointment of an examiner. The examiner must be compensated for its time and,
if the examiner has retained professionals, they must be compensated as
well.16 In some cases, these fees have been considerable. However, if an
examiner is investigating the debtor or its business, this should relieve the
committees from the need to engage in a similar investigation. Particularly
if an examiner is appointed early in a Chapter 11 case, the costs of the
examiner may be offset in significant part by the savings of committees and
their professionals. In fact, if several committees would have investigated
84. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(6) (1988).
85. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. As with trustee appointments, the
statute provides that the court "shall" order the appointment of an examiner if the

appointment is inthe interests of the various constituencies. Use of the mandatory "shall"
suggests an intention to ensure that an examiner is readily available when such an

appointment is in the interests of the various constituencies.
86. Although the Bankruptcy Code contains no explicit authorization for an examiner
to retain professionals, examiners have been authorized to retain professionals when
necessary to enable the examiner to perform successfully his or her duties. Alternatively,
an organization may be appointed examiner, perhaps obviating the need to retain
professionals. Bankruptcy Code § 1104(c) requires the appointment of a "disinterested
person." 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c). The term "disinterested person" means a "person" who
meets the standards of 11 U.S.C. § 101(14). The term "person" includes an "individual,
partnership and corporation." 11 U.S.C. § 101(41). Thus, for example, a law firm or
accounting firm could be appointed examiner, eliminating a need for separate retention
of either lawyers or accountants.
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the same issues, there may actually be a net saving attributable to the
appointment of an examiner.
Because the costs are lower, an examiner should be available more
readily than a trustee to investigate matters or to serve other limited roles.
However, because the estate may nevertheless incur substantial costs, a
party requesting an examiner under the "interests" test must still be able to
show a commensurate benefit that makes the appointment one that is in fact
in the interest of the various constituencies.
For example, in In re Table Talk, Inc.,' the United States trustee
moved for the appointment of an examiner because the trustee was
concerned about the debtor's failure to meet its projections and about the
debtor's continuing losses. Although the failures and losses suggested that
the debtor's management might not have been capable of reorganizing the
debtor, the court refused to order the appointment of an examiner because
it found such an appointment was not in the interest of the estate. The court
observed that the creditors' committee had retained a distinguished
accounting firm to investigate the debtor's operations and that no party had
shown why that firm's investigation would not be sufficient. In the absence
of such a showing, the court refused to find that it would be in the interest
of the various constituencies to add another "functionary" to the parties
already involved in the case. 8
Similarly, in In re Mechem Financialof Ohio, Inc.,89 the court refused
to appoint an examiner even though the debtor had failed to place trust funds
in a financial institution, as required by Ohio law, and may have misallocated funds among related corporations. The court observed that the
debtor had subsequently retained a financial institution to act as independent
trustee of the funds and was, by the time of the hearing, in compliance with
Ohio law.' The court found that any remaining investigation that might be
necessary could be performed by the creditors' committee and that, in the
absence of any evidence of fraud or dishonesty on the part of the debtor,
there was simply insufficient cause to justify the imposition of another layer
of expense on the estate. 9
Although not all cases are ripe for an examiner, there are significant
potential benefits that may result from the appointment of an examiner in
appropriate cases. An examiner can assist in determining early in a case
whether there is any meaningful chance that a viable business can emerge
from the reorganization. An examiner also can clear the air with respect to

87. 22 B.R. 706 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
88. Id.at 712.

89. 92 B.R. 760 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
90. Id.at 760-61.
91. Id.at 761.
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other factual and, perhaps, legal issues that are of concern to the parties. An
independent, impartial examination may have more credibility than an
investigation by the debtor or a committee, who likely has an interest in the
conclusions reached after investigation. Investigation by an examiner may
avoid multiple investigations about the same issue. Moreover, because an
examiner is usually not distracted by other aspects of the reorganization
effort, the examiner's investigation may be concluded relatively quickly,
giving the parties the benefit of the information obtained and the conclusions
reached early in a case, before positions have hardened.
An examiner may provide other benefits available from the intervention
of an independent third party without incurring the costs, or creating the
disruption, of a trustee. As the only other independent third party expressly
recognized by the Code, an examiner may be able to diffuse tensions among
the various constituencies by mediating in plan negotiations or other
disputes, assisting the debtor with management or reorganization decisions,
or performing other tasks that can best be accomplished by a party
unconnected with any of the constituencies in the case.
Moreover, although a party requesting an examiner should be required
to show a benefit commensurate with the cost, that benefit need not
necessarily be enhanced value to the estate. In a bankruptcy proceeding,
there is value to maintaining the credibility of the process in the eyes of the
various constituencies. The availability of an objective investigation of the
debtor's conduct or operations may have considerable value even if it is not
intended to lead to any recovery of property or reduction of claims.
The second ground for appointment of an examiner differs entirely from
the grounds for trustee appointments. In larger cases-those in which the
debtor's fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts, other than normal trade debts,
taxes, and insider obligations, exceed $5,000,000-section 1104(b)(2)
requires the court to order the appointment of an examiner upon the request
of any party in interest or the United States trustee. 92 Under this standard,
the court may be required to order the appointment of an examiner even if
the appointment is not in the interest of the estate generally.
This mandatory ground for the appointment of an examiner applies only
in larger cases, in which there are more likely to be multiple constituencies,
public debt or equity holders, and parties who may not be represented adequately by the debtor or the committees. This standard appears to be the last
vestige of the "public company" exception in the Senate bill. As such, it
seems to provide any party in interest with a right to demand intervention
by an independent third party in order to assure a proper investigation of
issues of concern in the case and to validate the reorganization process.'

92. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(6)(2) (1988).
93. For example, in Morgenstern v. Revco D.S, Inc. (In re Revco D.S., Inc.), 898
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Although some courts have given effect to the mandatory language of
section 1104(b), 94 other courts have refused to follow the command and
have been unwilling to authorize the appointment of an examiner without a
showing of need, even when the request is made by a party in interest in a
case that meets the financial standard of section 1104(b). For example, in
In re Shelter Resources Corp.95 the court denied a request for the appointment of an examiner even though the financial test was met. In Shelter Resources both the Securities and Exchange Commission and an indenture
trustee moved for the appointment of an examiner to investigate allegations
made in a shareholders' derivative action. After the hearing on the examiner
motion, the shareholders' derivative action was settled, but the examiner
motion was not withdrawn. The court found that the issue underlying the
examiner request had become moot as a result of the settlement and that
appointment of an examiner would entail undue expense and delay to the
estate; therefore, the court denied the motion. In doing so, the court
determined that it was not bound by the mandatory language of section
1104(b) because "to slavishly and blindly follow the so-called mandatory
dictates of Section 1104(b)(2) is needless, costly and non-productive and
would impose a grave injustice on all parties herein.""
Similarly, in In re GIR Cos.,97 the court denied the appointment of
an examiner notwithstanding that the financial standard of section 1104(b)(2)
may have been satisfied. The United States trustee, who was joined by a
group of secured bank creditors and certain other creditors, requested an
examiner for the following reasons: (1) the debtor had been consistently late
in filing reports and schedules; (2) appointment of one independent
investigator would avoid duplication of effort by the various creditor
committees and their professionals; (3) an examiner could investigate why
prior confirmed plans had failed, whether there was mismanagement, and
the debtors' general financial picture; (4) an examiner could monitor the
disposition of estate assets and perhaps provide a framework for developing

F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1990), the court held that § 1104(b)(2) mandates the appointment of
an examiner upon the request of a party in interest, even if the bankruptcy court believes
that an examiner is unnecessary or unwarranted. Thus, the court of appeals refused to
permit the bankruptcy court to deny the appointment once an examiner was properly
requested. The court acknowledged, however, that the bankruptcy court can define the
role of the examiner in a manner that will be useful to the progress of the case. In this
regard, the bankruptcy court presumably would not be bound by the parties' vision of
an examiner's role, although the needs perceived by the parties would undoubtedly
inform the court's charge to the examiner.
94. E.g., id.
95. 35 B.R. 304 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983).
96. Id. at 305.
97. 43 B.R. 165 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
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a reorganization plan; and (5) an examiner could investigate numerous legal
issues presented by the debtors' complicated structure.9"
The court reviewed the legislative history of the examiner provision and
found that the provision was intended to protect public security holders.
Because the debtor in GhR was a private company, the court found that it
was not bound by the mandatory language of section 1104(b)(2). The court
also observed that it had already authorized the retention of "numerous
investigatory-type functionaries"" and that certain parties had moved for
the appointment of a trustee and a change of venue. Therefore, in the
court's view, appointment of an examiner would entail unnecessary expense
and delay to the detriment of the estate.
Interestingly, if the United States trustee's rationale for seeking the
appointment of an examiner were taken at face value, GAlR would appear
to present a compelling case for an independent third party. There were
clearly issues to investigate; there was a problem of potential duplication of
effort; and there were hints of management failures. Perhaps the court's
reluctance flowed from its intention to grant the change of venue motion,
which might entail appointment of a new examiner or trustee in the new
venue. Yet, if that was the primary motivation for the court's holding, it
would have been preferable for the court simply to transfer venue before
deciding the motion, and let the new court address the request. Instead, the
case seems to stand for the proposition that the mandatory language is not
mandatory and that even the compelling circumstances described by the
United States trustee are insufficient to justify the appointment of an
examiner. In view of the potential value of an examiner in a case like GhR,
it would be unfortunate if the case were viewed as authority for the discretionary denial of an examiner when there are issues to be investigated and
there is doubt about the parties' ability to investigate satisfactorily those
issues.
Even when denial of a request for the appointment of an examiner
appears to be in the interest of the estate, as it appeared.to the courts in
Shelter Resources and GHR, disregarding the clear, mandatory language of
section 1104(b)(2) is a disturbing example of judicial legislation. The statute
could not be more clear in mandating the appointment of an examiner under
certain circumstances. If concerned about expense or delay, a court can limit
the scope of the examiner's task or can place a cap on compensation.10
Disregard of such a clear statutory provision merely encourages disregard
of other clear legislative mandates.

98. Id. at 167.

99. Id. at 175.
100. See, e.g., Morgenstem v. Revco D.S., Inc. (In re Revco D.S., Inc.), 898 F.2d
498 (6th Cir. 1990).
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Moreover, a discretionary approach to the appointment of an examiner
may fail to acknowledge properly the underlying policy of providing third
party intervention in those cases in which a party in interest is uncomfortable with the representation provided by the debtor and the committee
structure. As a final remnant of the "public company" trustee sought in the
Senate's bankruptcy bill, it seems clear that Congress intended to validate
the Chapter 11 reorganization process by assuring that third party intervention would be available in larger cases any time a party in interest desires

such intervention.'°'
IV. ROLES FOR TRUSTEES AND EXAMINERS
Although Chapter 11 represents a relatively unstructured process that
often calls out for third party intervention, courts, as well as parties to
Chapter 11 proceedings, seem generally to focus more on the perceived
expense, delay, and disenfranchisement of the debtor that may result from
such intervention than on the potential benefits of such intervention in a
reorganization effort. In view of the enormous flexibility afforded by the
trustee and examiner concepts, however, in many cases an independent third
party might in fact prove useful in protecting various constituencies and
lending credibility to a reorganization effort.'" The value of third-party
intervention is illustrated by some of the uses of trustees and examiners in
reported cases. 11 The broad range of tasks assigned to trustees and
examiners, and the instances in which trustees or examiners have been
appointed, suggests that these independent third parties can play a useful
role in many bankruptcy cases.

101. One problem that is sometimes raised is that a request for appointment of an
examiner late in a case, for example on the eve of confirmation of a plan, may unfairly
delay resolution of the Chapter 11 case and may represent a strategic bargaining move
rather than a good-faith desire for an investigation. See, e.g., In re Schepps Food Stores,
Inc., 148 B.R. 27 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (examiner request made on eve of confirmation
denied). See generally 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 1104.03 (Lawrence P. King ed.,
15th ed. 1992). In such a case, a court might deny the appointment based on a theory
such as laches or, alternatively, might severely limit the scope of the examiner's duties
or compensation such that confirmation would not be unduly delayed. Id.
102. See Lawrence K. Snider, The Examiner in the ReorganizationProcess:A Need
to Modify, 45 Bus. LAW. 35, 39 (1989) (stating that courts should adopt broad test for
examiner appointment because examiners can play useful roles in satisfying creditors'
.right to know" and in resolving "the many conflicting interests in the reorganization
process").
103. Apparently, only a small percentage of cases in which trustees or examiners are
appointed result in reported opinions. Therefore, there are likely many unreported cases
in which trustees and examiners have played useful roles in protecting parties' interests
and assisting in reorganization efforts.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/8
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Trustees and examiners have traditionally performed two primary
functions in reorganization cases. First, they have been expected to
investigate the debtor's management and operations to determine whether
current management was appropriate, whether the debtor could be
reorganized, and whether causes of action that might benefit the estate
should be pursued. Second, they have replaced the debtor's management
when management appeared to be dishonest, incompetent, or incapable of
successfully reorganizing the debtor.
However, as bankruptcy cases have increased in complexity and parties'
interests have diverged, other potentially useful roles have developed. An
independent third party can defuse contentious disputes among the parties,
pursue tasks untainted by the appearance of conflict that may, in some cases,
infect various parties, and generally provide structure to a case to enable the
parties to reach agreement on a realistic and appropriate plan for reorganizing the debtor.
A court has enormous flexibility in delegating tasks to an independent
third party in a reorganization case. For example, a trustee may completely
replace the management of a debtor-in-possession or may be assigned a
more limited role. In those cases in which the debtor's management is
important to the ongoing business operations, a trustee may retain that
management for day-to-day operations and serve more of an oversight role
with respect to the business. A trustee may take the lead in investigating the
debtor or its operations" ° and perhaps in formulating a reorganization
plan. Or a trustee may play the more limited role of mediator or facilitator
to induce agreement on a plan among the various parties.
Similarly, an examiner may investigate and report on issues of
importance to the parties or may perform other roles in the case. In general,
the Code offers considerable flexibility with respect to a role for an
examiner in a Chapter 11 case.'0 5
Indeed, even the investigatory function itself is broad. Unless the court
orders otherwise, the examiner is not limited to investigation of fraud or
alleged misdeeds. Instead, the investigation may include "the operation of
the debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance of such busi-

104. See, e.g., In re Madison Management Group, 137 B.R. 275 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1992) (trustee appointed to investigate causes of action available to debtor and to pursue
viable actions).
105. 11 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (1988); see, e.g., In re Boileau, 736 F.2d 503 (9th Cir.
1984) (approving examiner with expanded powers). This flexibility may be increased
through the use of the court's general equity power granted by 11 U.S.C. § 105. See,
e.g., In re Gaslight Club, Inc., 782 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1986) (appointment of "person
in control" instead of trustee); In re FSC Corp., 38 B.R. 346 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983)
(appointment of "responsible officer" when debtor had no officers or directors).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

35

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 8
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:907

ness"10 6 and, even more broadly, "any other matter relevant to the case
or to the formulation of a plan."" ° Thus, the examiner may truly serve as
the "eyes and ears" of the court and the various constituencies involved in
the case.
The flexibility of the trustee and examiner concepts affords the court the
opportunity to create a role that is best suited to assisting in the management
or investigation of the debtor and in resolving issues that arise during the
case. The reported cases and other commentary suggest various useful roles
for an independent third party. A discussion of some of these roles follows.
A. Management of Debtor
When there is substantial evidence that the debtor's management has
engaged in fraud, gross mismanagement, or other conduct inconsistent with
its role as fiduciary for the estate and its various constituencies, appointment
of a third party to manage the business is mandated both by the language of
section 1104 and by the underlying policy of protecting the constituencies
who have a real economic interest in the proper functioning of the debtor.' 8 In a Chapter 11 case, creditors and shareholders have such a strong
interest in the economic operation of the debtor and the honest formulation
of a reorganization or liquidation proposal that they should not be saddled
with a management team that cannot properly represent their interests. When
the debtor's management has engaged in serious fraud, mismanagement, or
other conduct inconsistent with its role as a fiduciary, the management
cannot provide the various constituencies with comfort that the reorganization effort will be pursued diligently and honestly. 09

106. 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(3).
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., In re U.S. Communications of Westchester, Inc., 123 B.R. 491, 495
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991):
In the instant case, the debtor has engaged in certain conduct which
reveals a lack of competence to conduct a business operation in furtherance
of its fiduciary duty to its creditors.... Such conduct results in a complete
erosion of trust and confidence by creditors. A court's willingness to allow a
debtor's management to remain in possession "is premised upon an assurance
that the officers and managing employees can be depended upon to carry out
the fiduciary responsibilities of a trustee."
(quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985)
(quoting Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633 (1963))).
109. Id. In In re Mako, Inc., 102 B.R. 809 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1988), the court
attempted to describe the type of mismanagement that would support the appointment of

a trustee: "Incompetency has its roots in mismanagement, requiring a showing of a lack
of business acumen and ability ....

Gross mismanagement suggests some extreme

ineptitude on the part of management to the detriment of the organization. But it must
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/8
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The court typically discovers management's misdeeds through a motion
by a creditor, creditors' committee, or United States trustee for the appointment of a trustee. The motion process provides an opportunity to explore
fully the allegations of fraud, misconduct, or mismanagement that led to the
request for a trustee.
Sometimes the examiner and trustee concepts can work together to flesh
11°
out misbehavior. For example, in In re Cumberland Investment Corp.,

the court appointed an examiner to investigate allegations of management
misconduct. The examiner reported significant management failures,
obstructions, falsities, and unauthorized actions that suggested the need for
a trustee to take over and terminate the business. The court adopted the
examiner's suggestion and ordered the appointment of a trustee.'
Although management's gross misconduct normally leads to the
appointment of a trustee, a few courts have authorized examiners to run
debtors' businesses or otherwise to control the reorganization.' 12 These
courts may have been seeking to avoid the loss, automatic upon the
appointment of a trustee, of the debtor's exclusive period to file a reorganization plan. 1 Alternatively, they may simply have been seeking to
preserve some role for the debtor's current owners or managers.
However, it is difficult to justify appointment of an examiner, as
opposed to a trustee, to run the business. Such an appointment appears to
be inconsistent with both the statutory language describing the examiner's
duties and with the underlying debtor-in-possession policy of Chapter 11.
Section 1106(b) authorizes the examiner to investigate and report, and to
perform "any other duties of the trustee that the court orders the debtor-inpossession not to perform." 4 The trustee's duties, which are primarily

rise above simple mismanagement to achieve the level envisioned by the Code." Id. at
812 (citations omitted); see also In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 168 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1990):
[Slome degree of mismanagement exists in virtually every insolvency
case .... While a certain amount of mismanagement of the debtor's affairs
prior to the filing date may not be sufficient grounds for the appointment of
a trustee, continuing mismanagement of the affairs of a debtor after the filing
date is evidence of the need for the appointment of a trustee.
(citations omitted).
110. 118 B.R. 3 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990).
111. Id. at7.
112. See, e.g., In re John Peterson Motors, Inc., 47 B.R. 551 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985)
(giving examiner powers and duties of trustee); In re Liberal Market, Inc., 11 B.R. 742
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) (authorizing examiner to operate business); see also In re
Boileau, 736 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1984) (approving examiner with expanded powers).
113. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(1) (1988).
114. Id. § 1106(b).
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investigative and reporting duties, are listed in section 1106(a). 115
Notably absent from the list of a trustee's duties is a duty to operate the
business. Instead, section 1108 provides that the trustee "may operate the
debtor's business." 16 This appears to be a right or power of a trustee
rather than a duty. Indeed, section 1107, in describing the role of a debtorin-possession, distinguishes between rights and powers, on the one hand,
and functions and duties, on the other. 17 If this distinction applies to section 1106, the authorization to operate the business would seem to be a right
or power, rather than a duty, and would, under this analysis, be excluded
from the examiner's charge." 8
This analysis is consistent with the underlying Chapter 11 policy of
attempting to leave the debtor in possession of the business, subject only to
oversight by committees, the court, and, perhaps, an examiner. If a court
could displace management without finding that the more stringent standards
for appointment of a trustee have been satisfied, then that policy may not be
well served.
Nevertheless, the flexibility of the examiner concept may allow for
useful intervention when discrete management issues must be resolved. For
example, in In re Apex Oil Co.," 9 the relationship between the debtor and
its bank lenders had become so bitter by the time the debtor commenced its
Chapter 11 case that it seemed likely that litigation between them would
prevent the debtor from continuing to operate or reorganizing successfully.
The examiner was able to stabilize the relationship by monitoring budget
and operating reports, obtaining commitments for preparation of an asset
deployment plan, and facilitating exchange of financial and budgetary
information. The examiner also arranged permission for the debtor to trade
oil futures contracts on the Mercantile Exchange, expedited approval of
government contracts, monitored retention of professionals and their
compensation applications, preserved utility services, preserved executory
contracts and unexpired leases, and dealt with various reclamation claimants.
These management efforts had the effect of preserving the debtor's
operations and, through that, its going concern value, without replacing
existing management.
In other cases, the examiner might, in addition to investigating the

115. Id. § 1106(a). The duties also include filing a plan, reporting on why a plan is
not being filed, or recommending that the case be converted.
116. Id. § 1108 (emphasis added).
117. See id.§ 1107.
118. See In re International Distrib. Ctrs., Inc., 74 B.R. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); see
also Snider, supranote 102, at 47.
119. 111 B.R. 235 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990), rev'd, 132 B.R. 235 (E.D. Mo. 1991),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 960 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1992).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/8
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debtor's operations, provide management consulting advice that could assist
the debtor in running the business without replacing the debtor-in-possession. This less drastic alternative may be appropriate when management is
somewhat weak, but neither dishonest nor grossly incompetent. In such
cases, the Code's preference for leaving the debtor in possession of the
business and retaining the debtor's exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan may be well served by assigning an examiner an advisory role that
does not displace the debtor.
B. Provide Confidence Level for Various Constituencies
The Chapter 11 process is relatively informal. In most cases, the
debtor's management operates the business, making a wide range of shortand long-term business decisions. Although these decisions may be subject
to the general oversight of a creditors' committee1 20 and may require court
approval,12 the debtor is accorded some deference and retains considerable flexibility in operational decisions." The debtor's management also
influences the plan negotiation process through the debtor's exclusive right
to propose a plan. Through this process, the debtor can often shape the
postbankruptcy operation.
Creditor oversight of the debtor's operations, and involvement in plan
negotiations, is often limited to the creditors' committee appointed to
represent creditors. Yet in some cases there is no active creditors' committee, and in others the creditors' committee may not represent all of the
creditor constituencies adequately. Similarly, equity interests may have
difficulty attracting attention for their views, particularly if an equity
committee is not appointed."z
Parties to this unique process of reorganizing a business may develop
concerns about whether their interests will be represented and protected

120. Some commentators have noted that, particularly in smaller cases, it is not
uncommon for a creditors' committee to be either inactive or nonexistent. See, e.g.,
Jensen-Conklin, supra note 31, at 326 (survey of Chapter 11 cases in Poughkeepsie,
N.Y. found that creditors committees were appointed in only 49% of cases in sample in
which Chapter 11 plan was confirmed). In those cases in which there is no creditors'
committee, the debtor may have even greater discretion unless there is a large creditor
who is willing to devote resources to monitoring the debtor's operations.
121. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (requiring court approval for use, sale, or lease of
property out of ordinary course of business); id. § 364(b),(c),(d) (requiring court
approval for most post-petition financing arrangements); id. § 365(a) (requiring court
approval for assumption or rejection of executory contracts).
122. See, e.g., In re Minges, 602 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1979) (applying business judgment
rule to debtor's decision to assume or reject executory contracts).
123. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 78.
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adequately. When realistic concerns arise, the intervention of an independent
third party may alleviate many of these concerns by providing greater access
to information, management skills, and a general sense of fairness. This
confidence-building function has taken various forms in reported cases.
1. Investigative Functions
An independent third party is often particularly well suited to investigate issues of concern to the parties and to provide an impartial report that
has greater credibility than a report from an interested party. By fleshing out
facts and issues for the parties, an impartial report can assist the parties in
resolving disputed issues and reaching agreement on a reorganization plan.
An investigation might also determine whether the debtor's business is
viable and worth reorganizing.' 24
In cases in which a trustee is appointed, one of the primary tasks for
the trustee is to investigate the debtor's business, including its prior
management and its prospects for the future. A report by an independent
trustee will, of course, have a level of credibility that would be unavailable
to prior management if there were suspicions of fraud, gross mismanagement, or other failings."z The trustee is generally expected to investigate
the debtor's past dealings, the current state of the business, the future
prospects of the business, and any other matters that may be relevant to the
case or to the development and confirmation of a plan.' 26
Even when the debtor remains in possession of the business, an
independent, impartial investigation may create an increased confidence level
in the parties' grasp of underlying facts in order to enable the parties to
resolve a case. 127 For example, in In re 1243 20th St., Inc.,128 the debtor
was managed by another corporation in which the debtor's president was an

124. When a debtor remains in possession of the estate, the trustee's duty to

investigate the debtor is not imposed on the debtor-in-possession. See 11 U.S.C. §
1107(a) (1988). This is sensible because a debtor is unlikely to be able to investigate
credibly its own conduct and operations. In such cases, the investigatory duty is normally
assumed by the creditors' committee. See id. § 1103(c)(2).
125. See, e.g., In re Madison Management Group, 137 B.R. 275, 281-82 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1992) (explaining that trustee needed to investigate various causes of action
against controlling persons when debtor's manager was hired by controlling persons).
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(3).
127. One commentator has suggested that an early, nonadversarial, independent review
of the viability of the business and the advisability of leaving management in contro
might better serve the interests of parties in the case. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debto

in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter11 of the Bankruptcy Code? (pt. 1)5'
AM. BANKa. L.J. 99, 114 (1983).
128. 6 B.R. 683 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1980).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/8
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officer and director. The management company also managed other
companies in which the debtor's president had an interest, and there were
some suspicious transactions between the debtor and the other companies.
The creditors' committee sought the appointment of an examiner to
investigate the debtor's dealings with the related companies and other allegations of fraud and mismanagement.
The court found that a report by a disinterested third party would
enable the parties to clear the air and ultimately to resolve issues crucial to
the reorganization process. The court also observed that an examiner was
better suited than a creditors' committee to perform the investigation because
the examiner would be completely disinterested and would therefore have
greater credibility. Moreover, the court did not believe that a committee
could undertake effectively an in-depth investigation of the debtor's prior
dealings, as opposed to monitoring the debtor's finances and operations. 29
Similarly, in In re Apex Oil Co.,130 the court explained that an

examiner had been appointed, in part, to investigate the debtor's affairs,
including numerous transactions with insiders and nondebtor affiliates."'
According to the court, the examiner identified several substantial claims
against principals of the debtor and nondebtor affiliates; however, he
concluded that settlement, rather than protracted litigation, would be in the
estate's interest. The examiner's report served as a catalyst to negotiations
that led eventually to the debtor's proposing a reorganization plan that was
more favorable to the unsecured creditors than earlier proposals. Moreover,
with the facts clearly set out for them, the parties had less need to litigate
the issues addressed
in the examiner's report and were instead able to settle
32
their differences.1

In cases with multiple constituencies, the appointment of an examiner
may provide a means of avoiding the duplicative expense of various constituencies investigating the same issues. Moreover, an impartial examiner's
report will not be subject to the suspicion of bias that might taint a
committee's report. For example, in some cases, independent examinations
of fraudulent conveyance and other issues obviated the need for various
committees to perform similar tasks and provided unbiased factual and legal
analyses that could serve as a basis for settling complex issues. 33 In
129. Id. at 685-86.
130. 111 B.R. 235 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990), rev'd, 132 B.R. 613 (E.D. Mo. 1991),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 960 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1992).
131. Id. at 242. The examiner's charge was to take "any necessary and appropriate
actions in furtherance of assisting the Court and parties in bringing these proceedings to
a just, prompt and economic disposition." Id. at 237.
132. See also In re Hamiel & Sons, Inc., 20 B.R. 830 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982)
(examiner appointed to investigate allegations of self-dealing by principals of debtor).
133. For example, in both the Revco D.S. and the Interco bankruptcies, examiners
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addition, parties may be more willing to co-operate with an impartial,
independent examiner, who will not be pursuing litigation against them, than
with the debtor or committee representatives. Accordingly, the examiner
may be able to obtain more complete information in a more efficient
manner.
Particularly in smaller cases, in which there may not be an active
creditors' committee, another subject for investigation might be whether the
debtor's business is viable and worth reorganizing. Although the reported
cases do not suggest that such investigations are common, an early viability
study might weed out the cases involving businesses that have little or no
hope of survival. An independent third party is more likely than the debtor
to be able to take a fresh, hard look at the business and determine whether
the reorganization is worth pursuing.
2. Conflicts of Interest
In a Chapter 11 proceeding, there is considerable potential for conflicts
of interest. Principals of the debtor represent the estate, but they may have
been the beneficiaries of avoidable transfers or may otherwise be in a
position to benefit at the expense of the estate or the creditors. Members of
the creditors' committee represent the creditor body generally, but they will
also have in mind their own individual interests. A debtor may have
affiliates with whom it deals on terms that are not at arms length. When the
appearance or fact of conflict becomes a significant impediment to resolution
of issues in a case, the intervention of an independent third party may
alleviate the difficulty.
For example, in Oklahoma Refining Co. v Blaik (In re Oklahoma
Refining Co.),'34 the conflict involved a debtor's preferential dealings with
affiliated companies. In Oklahoma Refining, creditors moved for the
appointment of a trustee after they discovered that the debtor had dramatically increased sales to affiliated companies on credit and at substantially
discounted prices. The creditors alleged that the debtor had artificially inflated the prices it charged third parties in order to discourage others from
buying its fuel and to assure ample fuel to sell to its affiliates on credit. The
court held that the questionable transactions with affiliated companies
constituted cause for the appointment of a trustee under section

were appointed to investigate and report on causes of action flowing from highly
leveraged transactions. See Morgenstern v. Revco D.S., Inc. (In re Revco D.S., Inc.),
898 F.2d 498, 500-01 (6th Cir. 1990); Official Comm. of Unsecured Debenture Holders
v. Interco, Inc. (In re Interco, Inc.), 135 B.R. 631, 632 (Bankr. E.D. Mo 1992). These
reports provided some basis for consensual reorganization plans.
134. 838 F.2d 1133 (10th Cir. 1988).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/8
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In In re Madison Management Group136 the managers and directors
of the debtor resigned prior to the commencement of the Chapter 11 case
and were replaced by a workout specialist, who was elected as the sole
director and then as president of the debtor. After the commencement of the
bankruptcy case, several creditors moved for the appointment of a trustee,
alleging that they had a lack of confidence in the workout specialist. Moreover, the creditors asserted that the specialist would be reluctant to pursue
avoidance actions available against the major stockholder of the debtor
because the stockholder had hired the specialist. The court found no
evidentiary basis for the creditors' lack of confidence, but held that a trustee
should be appointed for the sole purpose of pursuing the avoidance actions
against the stockholder. The court further found that the specialist's
appointment by the stockholder created an appearance of conflict that could
be overcome by appointing an independent trustee. At the same time, the
court could discern no reason to replace the specialist and thereby incur the
cost and delay of starting with new management.
Interestingly, the role to be played by the trustee in Madison Management illustrates the flexibility available to courts in utilizing third parties.
The trustee was not expected to manage the business or propose a Chapter
11 plan; its role was limited to investigating the basis for avoidance actions
and pursuing those actions if appropriate. By retaining the workout specialist
to manage the business and to propose a reorganization plan, the court
37
avoided the expense and delay involved in installing new management.1

135. Id. at 1136; see also In re State Capital Corp., 51 B.R. 400 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1985); In re William H. Vaughan & Co., Inc., 40 B.R. 524 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); In
re Humphreys Pest Control Franchises, 40 B.R. 174 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); Smith v.
Concord Coal Corp. (In re Concord Coal Corp.), 11 B.R. 552 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va.
1981); In re Main Line Motors, Inc., 9 B.R. 782 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re L.S.
Good & Co., 8 B.R. 315 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1980).
In In re Nautilus of N.M., Inc., 83 B.R. 784 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1988), the debtor
leased space from its president, who was also a co-owner of the debtor. Although several
significant debts incurred during the reorganization effort remained unpaid, the president
assured that lease payments were made. The court found that the conflict between the
president's role as manager and his role as a creditor, coupled with the debtor's failure
to file reports in a timely fashion, necessitated the appointment of a trustee. Id. at 78990.
In In re Microwave Prods. of Am., Inc., 102 B.R. 666 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1989),
the court justified appointment of a trustee in part because the debtor had failed to
investigate or pursue potential claims against insiders.
136. 137 B.R. 275 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
137. However, appointment of a trustee to serve such a limited role could have
unacceptable costs under the current statute. By appointing a trustee instead of an
examiner, the court subjected the debtor to the expiration of its exclusive period to file
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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Conflict issues can sometimes be resolved by the appointment of an
examiner. An examiner may at least be able to investigate and report on
issues that underlie the conflict. For example, in In re Hamiel & Sons,
Inc., 3' an examiner was appointed to investigate allegations of self-dealing
by principals of the debtor in a case in which there was no creditors'
committee to investigate the allegations. However, an examiner may not be
able to implement recommendations for resolving issues, in which case a
trustee may become necessary after all.
3. Pursuitof Litigation on Behalf of Estate
An independent third party may be able to pursue litigation on behalf
of the estate more effectively than a debtor-in-possession or, perhaps, a
creditors' committee. In some cases, conflicts of interest may prevent the
debtor or a committee from pursuing litigation. In others, the debtor may be
unwilling or unsuited to pursue litigation, and a creditors' committee may
not be able to fill the void. For example, a debtor may resist pursuing trade
preferences or certain fraudulent conveyance actions, and a creditors'
committee may be composed of potential targets of the litigation. If other
creditors would benefit from pursuit of the litigation, it may be necessary
to identify a party to pursue the action. In the absence of any proper party
in interest, an independent third party may be necessary.
A trustee is certainly expected to pursue litigation on behalf of the
estate in order to recover property of the estate, or pursuant to the trustee's
avoidance powers. Indeed, in Madison Management the trustee was
appointed specifically to investigate and pursue any available claims against
controlling persons.' 39
In In re Carnegie InternationalCorp.,140 an examiner was authorized
to pursue litigation on behalf of the estate. In Carnegie International,the
examiner had completed and reported on an investigation of potential causes
of action available to the estate. Three days after the examiner filed his
report, the court entered an order authorizing the examiner to institute
litigation based on the causes of action identified by the examiner in his

a plan, see 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (1988), a result that does not seem to have been
intended by the court. This result suggests that perhaps a court needs some discretion to
protect the debtor's exclusivity when a trustee does not actually replace current
management. Discretion might be found in 11 U.S.C. § 105, the provision granting
general equitable power to the Bankruptcy Court. It would be preferable, however, to

increase the court's flexibility in using third parties by clarifying that exclusivity is lost
only when management is actually displaced by a trustee.

138. 20 B.R. 830 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
139. 137 B.R. at 282.
140. 51 B.R. 252 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1984).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/8
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report. A party that was a target of the litigation objected to the expansion
of the examiner's duties.
The objecting party maintained that an examiner is entitled to investigate issues, but cannot be given the power to litigate matters that were the
subject of an examiner's report. According to the objector, authorizing the
examiner to pursue litigation would defeat the underlying purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code provisions that prohibit an examiner from serving as a
trustee in a case. 14' These provisions are designed to remove any appearance of incentive for an examiner to report that a trustee is necessary.
According to the objector, if an examiner can pursue the litigation that he
or she recommends, then the recommendation itself will be suspect.
The court rejected this argument and found that it could expand the
examiner's power to include the pursuit of litigation. It pointed out that the
estate would save expense that would be incurred if a new party, unfamiliar
with the facts and theories underlying the causes of action, were engaged to
pursue the litigation. 142
In response to the argument that the examiner's conclusions were
suspect because he might have expected to be retained to pursue causes of
action, the court pointed out that the examiner neither actively sought the
expanded duties nor knew that he would be asked to pursue the litigation.
Moreover, the court observed that both the creditors' and the equity
securities holders' committees moved for the expansion in the examiner's
powers instead of the appointment of a trustee, a special counsel, or pursuit
of the litigation by one of the committees.
The court also rejected the objector's argument that it had provided
information to the examiner in his quasi-judicial role and should not now be
subject to suit by the examiner who was given the information when he was
not, and did not expect to be, a litigant. The court observed that the
examiner's report was made available to the parties in the bankruptcy case
and would be available to any party pursuing litigation based on the report.
In the court's view, since any party would have the information, the fact
that the examiner would be pursuing the litigation should not be fatal. Thus,
the court held that it had properly authorized the examiner to initiate
litigation on behalf of the estate. 43

141. 11 U.S.C. §§ 321(b), 327(t) (1988).
142. Carnegie Intl, 51 B.R. at 256.
143. Id. at 256-58. The court also relied on authority under the prior Bankruptcy Act
which, it claimed, supported the view that an examiner may be authorized to bring litiga-

tion on behalf of the estate. Section 167 of the prior Act directed a trustee, if ordered by
the court, to investigate the debtor and its business and required that the trustee report
facts ascertained and any causes of action available to the estate. Bankruptcy Act § 167,

11 U.S.C. § 567 (1976) (repealed 1978). Bankruptcy Rule 10-208(a)(5) required the
trustee to file a report of his or her findings. Bankr. R. 10-108(a)(5). Bankruptcy Rule
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However, although the CarnegieInternationalcourt's authorization may
have seemed efficient under the facts of that particular case, the court failed
to appreciate sufficiently the potential adverse effect on examiners in other
cases. The independence and impartiality of examiners, who normally serve
in a quasi-judicial role, will be compromised if parties believe that an
examiner who recommends litigation may obtain a lucrative representation
pursuing the litigation.' 44 Moreover, parties will be less likely to cooperate willingly with an examiner if they believe that there is a meaningful
possibility that they will subsequently be litigating against the examiner. The
mere possibility that an examiner could pursue litigation recommended by
the report will make the examiner's task more difficult, even in those cases
in which the examiner is not ultimately authorized to pursue litigation on
behalf of the estate.
Consequently, examiners should not be authorized to pursue litigation
if the litigation results from an examiner's report. Even though the facts of
a particular case, such as Carnegie International,may seem to justify the
expansion of an examiner's powers to enable the examiner to initiate
litigation on behalf of the estate, courts must appreciate the potential for
problems that might be caused in future cases by such an expansion.
Nevertheless, an absolute rule that an examiner can never pursue
litigation on behalf of an estate would be unfortunate. In some cases, the
debtor and the creditors' committee may be so hopelessly conflicted that
only an independent third party can meaningfully pursue particular litigation
on behalf of the estate. A trustee may not be appropriate if the debtor is
otherwise suitable to remain in possession and retain the exclusive right to
propose a reorganization plan. In such cases, an impartial examiner may be
well suited to pursue the litigation. However, because of the examiner's own
"appearance of conflict" issues, an examiner's ability to pursue litigation on
10-610 authorized the trustee to commence and prosecute any action on behalf of the
estate. Bankr. R. 10-610. Finally, Bankruptcy Act § 168 authorized the court to appoint
an examiner "to prepare and file a plan and to perform the duties imposed upon a trustee
under [the provisions of section 167 discussed above]." Bankruptcy Act § 168, 11
U.S.C. § 568 (1976) (repealed 1978). According to the Carnegie Int'l court, these

provisions, taken together, authorized an examiner to bring an action on behalf of the
estate. The court pointed out that the structure of Bankruptcy Code §§ 1104 and 1106,

providing for the appointment of trustees and examiners and delineating their duties, is
similar to the structure of the provisions under the prior Act. Therefore, the court found

authority under the prior Act persuasive for purposes of determining the permissible
scope of an examiner's powers under the Bankruptcy Code. See CarnegieInt'l, 51 B.R.

at 255-57.
144. The same policies that underlie the prohibition on examiners serving as trustees
or being employed by trustees, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 321, 327 (1988), would support a
prohibition on examiners pursuing litigation recommended in their own reports. See
Snider, supra note 102, at 49.
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behalf of the estate should be limited to matters that were not investigated
by the examiner and on which the examiner did not report. 45 If the
examiner has reported on the matter, recommending litigation, and if there
is no party well positioned to bring the litigation, the court may have to
appoint a trustee or, perhaps, another examiner or "responsible person" to
pursue the litigation on behalf of the estate.
4. Fraud
An independent third party can increase parties' confidence levels when
the debtor is suspected of fraud or serious dishonesty. Bankruptcy Code
section 1104(a) requires the appointment of a trustee "for cause, including
fraud, [or] dishonesty." 14 6 In cases of fraud, then, the usual remedy is
appointment of a trustee, who can replace the debtor-in-possession and both
investigate and cure fraudulent activities. 47

145. Under the prior Bankruptcy Act, a Chapter X reorganization plan could provide
for settlement or compromise of claims and, if the claims were not resolved, "for their
retention and enforcement by the trustee or, if the debtor has been continued in
possession, by an examiner appointedfor thatpurpose." Bankruptcy Act § 216(13), 11
U.S.C. § 616 (13) (1976) (repealed 1978) (emphasis added). Apparently the examiner
could enforce the debtor's rights when the examiner was appointed specifically for that
task.
Similarly, 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B) provides that a Chapter 11 plan may provide
for "the retention and enforcement by the debtor, by the trustee, or by a representative
of the estate appointed for such purpose" of causes of action belonging to the debtor or
to the estate. The House report refers to an "agent" appointed to enforce causes of
action. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 4, at 407, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6363. Presumably the statute is referring to a representative, or agent, appointed on or
after confirmation for the express purpose of pursuing causes of action on behalf of the
debtor. To maintain the examiner's quasi-judicial neutrality, such an interpretation seems
appropriate. Nevertheless, the language seems broad enough to enable a court, hopefully
only in extraordinary cases, to designate an examiner as the "representative" to pursue
litigation on behalf of the estate.
One commentator has argued that, because 11 U.S.C. §§ 321(b) and 327(f) prevent
an examiner from serving as a trustee, or from being employed by the trustee, the
examiner cannot bring litigation on behalf of the estate. He has maintained that pursuing
litigation is a "trustee-type" function that can be performed only by a trustee. See
Gumport, supra note 77, at 126. However, although the limitations in §§ 321 and 327
may have been intended to eliminate any incentive for an examiner to suggest litigation
or management changes in order to obtain a lucrative engagement, the Code does not
expressly bar the court from assigning the examiner a limited role in representing the
estate.
146. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988).
147. See, e.g.; In re Anniston Food-Rite, Inc., 20 B.R. 511 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982);
In re Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 B.R. 781 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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Nevertheless, appointment of a trustee need not be automatic upon a
party's allegation of fraud, even if the allegation is believed. One benefit of
the flexible trustee and examiner concepts is that they enable the court to
fashion a remedy appropriate to the circumstances involved.
Yet some courts have failed to recognize the degree of flexibility
accorded to them. For example, in In re McCordi Corp.," prior to
commencing a Chapter 11 case, the debtor engaged in a check kiting
scheme, which fraudulently induced a secured lender to cover overdrafts
over an approximately two-week period just prior to the bankruptcy
filing. 49
1 After the bankruptcy filing, the lender moved for the appointment
of a trustee based on the debtor's prepetition fraud. The debtor and the
creditors' committee objected.
The court found that it was obligated to order the appointment of a
trustee once it found that the debtor had committed prepetition fraud.
Although the court acknowledged that this was "not a case in which fraud
has permeated all the operations of the debtor," that the case did not
"involve fraudulent transfers of property or the concealment of assets," and
that the fraud affected only one creditor, 50 the court believed that it had
no choice but to order the appointment of a trustee because "'fraud' is sufficient 'cause' mandating such appointment [under section 1104].""'
Yet the posture of the case suggests that perhaps the lender was acting
strategically for its own benefit rather than seeking a remedy for the benefit
of the estate.' 52 Surely the court retains some discretion to determine
whether a particular fraud rises to the level of "cause" required by section
1104 for the appointment of a trustee.
In justifying its order for the appointment of a trustee, the McCordi
court observed that a trustee could review the debtor's business operations
and investigate prepetition payments, which would benefit the estate generally. However, the court did not explain why the creditors' committee or an
examiner could not perform those tasks. If the court was concerned that a
major creditor had no confidence in management and was thus entitled to an
independent third party's intervention, it did not discuss any such concern.
Moreover, even if that were the case, the court might have obtained
sufficient intervention through the less drastic measure of appointing an
148. 6 B.R. 172 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
149. The debtor claimed that the secured lender was pressuring it to make payments
that it was unable to make and that it was forced to engage in the scheme in order to
survive. Id. at 176.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 178.
152. Interestingly, the lender may have gotten more than it bargained for. The court
ordered that the trustee investigate not only the debtor's fraud, but also whether the
payments to the lender might be avoidable as preferences or otherwise. See id.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/8
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examiner.
The McCordi court may have been somewhat less concerned than some
courts about the expense and interference of a trustee because the court
seems to have envisioned retention of the debtor's management to operate
the business. The court authorized the trustee to "discretionally retain the
present management with suitable controls." 5 3 However, unlike the
appointment of an examiner, which could have served the investigative and
business oversight functions without divesting the debtor of control, the
appointment of a trustee ended the debtor's exclusive period to propose a
plan and divested the debtor of control over the business. If, in fact, the
lender's behavior was strategically based, the remedy may have been unduly
harsh in light of the debtor's limited misconduct.
5. Eyes and Ears
When the 1978 Bankruptcy Code removed from the bankruptcy courts'
jurisdiction a broad range of administrative matters that arise in Chapter 11
cases, it limited the information available to the courts. Although these
courts may hold status conferences from time to time, they generally receive
information about the progress of a case and about underlying issues in the
context of litigation. Similarly, parties to a Chapter 11 proceeding typically
receive somewhat limited information about the debtor and its operations,
and are dependent on the debtor for the information they do receive.
One area in which third-party intervention can sometimes be useful is
in addressing these informational disadvantages. A party that is not a litigant
and represents no particular constituency may be able to investigate and
report more credibly than the debtor or the creditors. Information thus
gained about the debtor and the progress of the case may assist both the
court and the parties in resolving particular issues, as well as the Chapter
11 case generally.
In this regard, some bankruptcy courts have employed examiners as the
"eyes and ears" of the court and the various constituencies in an effort to
move a case along and to assure that various constituencies are properly
protected during the proceeding. For example, in In re Public Service
Co.,54 the court ordered the appointment of an examiner to, among other
things, assist the court in understanding concepts involved in utility-rate
setting and in evaluating the accuracy of any competing disclosure
statements. Similarly, in In re Apex Oil Co.,"' the examiner pursued

153. Id.
154. 99 B.R. 177 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989).

155. 111 B.R. 235 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990), revd, 132 B.R. 613 (E.D. Mo. 1991),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 960 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1992).
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various tasks and investigations to apprise the court and the parties of the
facts underlying certain issues and of the progress of the case.
6. GeneralLoss of Confidence
In some cases, creditors may experience a general loss of confidence
in the ability of the debtor's management to run the business or to
reorganize the debtor. The loss of confidence may be so severe that it
requires a complete change of management. Sometimes, however, confidence may be restored by providing assistance to the current managers. In
either case, the intervention of an independent third party may assist in
restoring the parties' confidence in the debtor and the Chapter 11 process.
For example, in In re Cardinal Industries,11 6 the debtor had made
various detrimental management decisions both before and after the
commencement of the Chapter 11 case. The debtor also failed to submit
certain financial reports and made numerous mistakes in the reports that
were submitted because it had failed to maintain adequate and accurate
books and records. Because the debtor's principals had guaranteed
substantial debt of the debtor and affiliated partnerships, the principals were
subject to potential conflicts of interest. Moreover, the debtor discharged its
bankruptcy counsel and paid a retainer to new counsel, whose retention was
then denied by the court because of a conflict. These events caused
uncertainty about who would represent the debtor. Finally, the debtor had
been unable to develop an adequate business plan that could be used as a
basis for a reorganization plan. The lack of a business plan, coupled with
the debtor's discharge of its counsel and the debtor's inability to determine
exactly where it stood financially, stalled the reorganization plan negotiation
process.
Ultimately, the creditors moved for the appointment of a trustee to
replace current management, in whom the creditors had no confidence. The
court found that although any of the factors cited by the creditors, taken
alone, might not justify the appointment of a trustee, the general loss of
confidence in the debtor's management justified the appointment of a trustee.
Moreover, the court determined that such an appointment would be in the
best interest of the various constituencies. The court pointedly observed that
the creditors' assertions of loss of confidence did not appear to be "a ploy"
but followed "good faith efforts by the Creditors to permit the Debtors to
direct their own reorganizations. " 57
The Cardinal court's action was consistent with the underlying
bankruptcy policy of ousting current management when the various

156. 109 B.R. 755 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
157. Id. at 765.
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constituencies lose confidence in management's ability to- continue the
business and reorganize successfully In this case, it appears that a strong,
hands-on, independent third party was necessary to restore that confidence
and effectuate a reorganization plan. Thus, an examiner probably would not
have fit the bill; a trustee, with its broad range of powers, was necessary to
assure that the various constituencies could rely on the fairness, impartiality,
and efficiency of the process.
C. Provide Structurefor Cases
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code presents a relatively unstructured
process for reorganizing a debtor. In most cases the debtor remains in
possession of the business, negotiates with creditors, and ultimately proposes
a reorganization plan. Yet the debtor may fail to pursue energetically and
effectively the reorganization effort, and other parties may be unable or
unwilling to pursue it themselves. Even when the debtor is focused on the
effort, various constituencies may be unable to agree upon acceptable terms
for a reorganization.
In some cases, the intervention of an independent third party may assist
in moving the process forward. When the debtor simply fails to pursue
effectively the reorganization, a trustee may be necessary to replace the
debtor and to represent the estate in developing a reorganization plan or
liquidating the business. 5 1 In other cases an independent party may assist
the various constituencies in resolving the reorganization effort.
1. Mediation of Plan Negotiations

In several cases examiners have been appointed to mediate in deadlocked plan negotiations. 59 Mediation seems particularly useful when the
debtor's exclusive period to file a plan has expired and there is an increased
likelihood that competing plans could be filed."6 The debtor's exclusive
period to file a plan imposes some structure on a Chapter 11 case. All of the
parties must work through the debtor; the debtor can assist in bringing the
parties to the table and hammering out an agreement. Once the debtor's
period of exclusivity has expired, parties may feel less compulsion to

158. See, e.g., In re Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 B.R. 781 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(trustee appointed in part to mediate dispute with major creditor, propose reorganization
plan, or report that no plan is possible).
159. See, e.g., In re Public Serv. Co., 99 B.R. 177 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989); In re
Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., No. 89-B-10449 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1989).
160. In Public Serv. Co., 99 B.R. 177, the examiner was authorized to mediate the
plan negotiations after the debtor's exclusivity had been terminated.
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negotiate because any party can file a plan and then attempt to obtain the
agreement of other constituencies. In that environment, an independent third
party may become a lightening rod for the parties, imposing structure on
plan negotiations that can increase the likelihood of a consensual plan.
This was exactly the situation in In re Public Service Co. 161In that
case, the court ordered the appointment of an examiner at the same time the
court terminated the debtor's exclusivity. In doing so, the court expressed
concern that, without a neutral third party to mediate in plan negotiations
and related rate negotiations, the parties would introduce competing
reorganization plans and would be unable to resolve their differences. In
fact, competing plans were filed by several outside bidders for PSNH, and
a bid was accepted by the major parties only after around-the-clock
negotiations. 62
1
The mediation role served by the examiner in Public Service Co. and
in other cases may not necessarily require an examiner. For example, in the
Zale Corp. bankruptcy, the court appointed a mediator "to assist the creditor
constituencies herein in their efforts to negotiate a consensual consolidated
Chapter 11 plan of reorganization covering all of the debtors."163 In
effect, the mediator appointed by the court would serve in a role similar to
that served by examiners in other cases, perhaps without engendering the
fear and strategic behavior sometimes present when an examiner is
appointed and expected to file a written report of findings. Yet, although the
Zale court decided to forego an examiner in favor of a mediator, there is no
explicit authority in the Bankruptcy Code for the appointment of a mediator,
a "responsible person," or any independent third party other than a trustee
or an examiner. " The apparent desire to provide independent input while
avoiding appointment of a trustee or examiner may suggest a need for
statutory recognition of some type of independent third party with a more
limited role than a trustee or examiner.

161. 99 B.R. 177 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989).
162. John Milne, Chronology of PSNH Bankruptcy, Jan. 28, 1988, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 10, 1989, New Hampshire Weekly, at 12.

163. In re Zale Corp., No. 392-30001-SAF-1 1 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 1992). The
court's order required the parties to co-operate with the mediator and to provide
information, including confidential information. The order also directed that no
information provided could be introduced at any subsequent trial or hearing in the case

and that the mediator could not be called as a witness or be hired as a consultant by any
party to the case.
Similarly, in the El Paso Electric bankruptcy, the court appointed a "mediator"
charged with "mov[ing] this case to a successful conclusion." DAILY BANKR. REV., Jan.
27, 1993, at 1.
164. To justify its appointment of a mediator, the Zale court relied on 11 U.S.C.
§ 105 (1988), which grants the court general equity jurisdiction.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/8
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2. Other Mediation Efforts
In some cases, an independent third party has served as a mediator of
various underlying disputes that must be resolved in order to enable the
debtor to develop, and obtain confirmation of, a plan. By fostering settlement of these disputes, an independent third party may assist in the ultimate
resolution of the reorganization effort.
For example, in In re Apex Oil Co. ,165 the examiner was directed to
mediate a bitter dispute between the debtor and its bank lenders concerning
the debtor's relationship with a nondebtor affiliate. The'dispute was so
contentious that the lenders had commenced an action to substantively
consolidate the estates of the debtor and its nondebtor affiliate on the same
day that the debtor commenced its Chapter 11 case. According to the court,
"[flull blown litigation of these conflicting claims appeared inevitable and
would have been extraordinarily disruptive." 6 According to the debtor,
the examiner's successful mediation effort "'eliminated a major dispute...
which, if not settled, might have jeopardized the prospects for a successful
reorganization.'"' 67
D. Provide Both Confidence and Structure
In several larger bankruptcy cases, examiners or trustees have been
used both to provide the various constituencies with some assurance that the
debtor is being investigated and monitored properly and to provide structure
to the case. For example, in In re A.H. Robins Co., the court gave the
examiner a broad mandate to investigate matters concerning the debtor's
business operations, to monitor the plan formulation process, to evaluate and
suggest provisions for proposed plans, and "'to take all other necessary and
appropriate action in furtherance of assisting to bring this case to a just,
prompt and economic disposition." 168
In the Eastern Airlines bankruptcy, 169 the examiner was directed to

165. 111 B.R. 235 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990), rev'd, 132 B.R. 613 (E.D. Mo. 1991),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 960 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1992).
166. Id. at 239.
167. Id. at 240 (quoting Apex Disclosure Statement). The examiner in Apex also
successfully resolved a significant number of personal injury claims that had been
brought against the debtor. The resolution of these claims at amounts substantially lower
than the plaintiffs' initial demands assisted in the debtor's reorganization effort. Id. at
240-41.
168. In re A.H. Robins Co., No. 85-01307-R (E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 1986), quoted in
Snider, supra note 102, at 50.
169. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., No. 89-B-10449 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1989),
quoted in Snider, supra note 102, at 50.
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investigate certain allegations with respect to asset sales, to mediate between
unions and management with respect to contentious labor relations issues,
and generally to mediate with respect to the plan negotiation process. 70
When even this broad charge was apparently insufficient to guide the parties
towards resolution of the case or to provide a sufficient confidence level for
the various constituencies,' 7 ' the court determined that new management
was necessary to restore that confidence72and ordered the appointment of a
trustee to take over and run the airline.
E. Propose ReorganizationPlan
One effect of the unstructured Chapter 11 process, particularly in
smaller cases, is that there may be no party to propose a realistic reorganization plan. The debtor's principals may be content simply to run the
business in Chapter 11, being compensated for their services. If there is no
active creditors' committee, even termination of the debtor's exclusivity may
fail to lead to the proposal of a plan unless there is a large creditor with
sufficient economic interest.
If the court discerns that no one is proposing a plan to bring the debtor
out of bankruptcy, it may appoint an independent third party to move the
process along and to propose a reorganization plan. For example, in In re
Bonded Mailings, Inc.," the court found that a trustee was necessary
because the debtor had failed to file a reorganization plan after almost a year
in Chapter 11. The court gave the trustee four months within which to file
a plan or to submit a report indicating why a plan could not be filed. '75
In In re Great BarringtonFair & Amusement, Inc., 76 the court had
previously ordered an examiner to file a statement of the basic essentials of
a plan or a statement of why the debtor could not be reorganized. 71 7 The

170. See WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 1989, at 4; Snider, supra note 102, at 50-51.
171. The debtor experienced "devastating, constantly expanding and unending losses,"

failed to predict adequately the results of its operations, reneged repeatedly on proposed
reorganization plans, and generally lost the confidence of its creditors. In re Ionosphere
Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 166 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).

172. Id. at 171. Even after the trustee's intervention, however, business failed to
improve sufficiently, and the airline was eventually liquidated.

173. See Kerkman, supranote 31, at 175-88; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full
Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code? (pt. 2), 57 AM.
BANKa. L.J. 247, 272 (1983).
174. 20 B.R. 781 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
175. Id. at 787.
176. 53 B.R. 241 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
177. Alternatively, the court directed the examiner to explain why the case should be
converted to Chapter 7 or dismissed.
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examiner filed a liquidating reorganization plan that was confirmed by the
court.

Interestingly, the Great Barrington court did not explain why it had
appointed an examiner, rather than a trustee, particularly where the debtor
was liquidating. It would appear that under 11 U.S.C. § 1106(b), which
authorizes the court to order the examiner to perform any trustee duties, 171
coupled with 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(5), which imposes on a trustee a duty to
file a plan or a statement of why a plan cannot be filed, 179 the court
technically may have had authority to order an examiner to file a plan.
However, any such authority to use an examiner to propose a plan should
be used sparingly, if at all. Because the debtor's exclusive right to file a
plan is an important component of the debtor-in-possession construct, a
court should not lightly permit a third party to file a plan on behalf of the
debtor unless the court has found that displacement of the debtor-inpossession and appointment of a trustee is appropriate. Thus, it would have
been preferable for the Great Barringtoncourt to have considered the appointment of an independent third party under the more rigorous standard
for appointing of a trustee. i'
V. CONCLUSION

In the relatively unstructured environment of Chapter 11, the intervention of independent third parties can assist in the reorganization or
liquidation of debtors. Flexible use of trustees and examiners also can help
add credibility to the Chapter 11 process. Trustees and examiners have been
used, inter alia, to manage debtors' businesses, investigate troublesome
issues, resolve conflicts of interest, pursue litigation, mediate disputes, assist
in plan negotiations, and propose plans. As courts and parties to Chapter 11
cases further recognize the positive and flexible roles that can be served by
trustees and examiners, some of the perceived problems with Chapter 11

178. 11 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (1988).
179. Id. § 1106 (a)(5).
180. In limited circumstances, appointment of a third party to propose a plan may be
appropriate even when the debtor has proposed a plan, if the debtor's plan is unrealistic
and has no meaningful chance of being confirmed. For example, in Hotel Assocs. v.
Trustees of Cent. States Pension Fund S.E. & S.W. (In re Hotel Assocs.), 3 B.R. 343
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980), the court held that appointment of a trustee was appropriate
when there was a need for a party other than the debtor to propose a reorganization plan.
According to the court, the debtor's plan seemed unrealistic and unsatisfactory.
Moreover, there was one large secured creditor that had taken over and was operating
the property. In the court's view, only an independent third party could propose a plan
that would adequately protect the needs of unsecured creditors. Id. at 344-45.
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reorganizations may be resolved through the use of these independent third
parties.
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